

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
 Contested Materials Collection
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	16		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Paper asking that a document be delivered to Strachan. Author unknown. 1 pg.
20	16		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Haldeman to RN RE: a useful memorandum. 1 pg.
20	16	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harlow to Haldeman RE: RN's image during the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20	16	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haig to Haldeman RE: thoughts on presidential posture and possible Democratic campaign strategies. 4 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	16	6/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Clawson to Haldeman RE: RN's role before and after the Republican National Convention, as well as important campaign issues. 5 pgs.
20	16	7/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to RN presenting analyses of the 1960 and 1968 elections. Graphs included. 8 pgs.
20	16	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Price to Haldeman RE: advice in response to a previous memo. 4 pgs.
20	16	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dent to Haldeman RE: campaign suggestions. 5 pgs.
20	16	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: Haldeman's previous memo asking for campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	16	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Haldeman RE: campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
20	16	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Finch to Haldeman RE: RN's posture as president and important campaign issues. 4 pgs.
20	16	6/25/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to RN RE: the possibility of Jackson becoming a presidential candidate. Handwritten note added by unknown. 4 pgs.

Hand carry to Gordon Strachan
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Eyes Only

DATE:

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

Herewith the
most useful of
the strategy memor.

H.

EYES ONLY

June 16, 1972

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Bob:

There is no chance at all for me to offer any novel or enlightened insights in responding to your June 21 memo, because I no longer share the authoritative political intelligence that you get right along from polls and professional politicians. So I really believe that, at least at this point in time, I should not respond at all, knowing you will get really useful information from associates with access to the current state of things across the country.

But I do have some general notions and submit them for whatever they are worth.

First -- and quite obviously -- no political planning right now on image and issue can be worth much of a damn until after the Democratic Convention has picked its ticket and written its platform. After all, the Convention is only three weeks away. Between now and then any political judgments have to be no better than sheer speculation.

Second, I think just about everybody in the country, not only our people but also a large proportion of the Democrats, would have to concede that the President is doing spectacularly well, as is borne out by the polls. I see two dominant reasons for this -- first, the miracles the President has wrought abroad, which at last have convinced the nation that Richard Nixon is the most effective achiever for a stable world order that the country has had in God knows how long -- this, plus the resurging confidence throughout the economy; and, second, but not unimportant, the remarkable disarray of the Democratic Party and its superbly uninspired leadership for the upcoming campaign. The simple fact appears to be that the President has been steadily building confidence in himself across the country,

these past 18 months particularly, while national confidence in the Democratic candidates has plummeted. I think the ingredients are present in the President's achievements for a victory of landslide proportions.

Now, second, I think one of the main reasons for the President's enviable political status right now is the deepening public belief that he is preoccupied, not with political maneuvering and expediency, but with paramount national concerns. I think this public assessment is the President's political Fort Knox, because his traditional vulnerability has been the accusation over the years that he is politician first and statesman second. He is well on his way to reversing this concept, and in the process is in fact being regarded now as President of all the people rather than as a strident leader of a negativistic minority called the Republican Party. I would greatly regret any move so to elevate politicking between now and, say, October 1 as would reawaken the notion that the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world statesman. In other words, please help fight off the pols who would pander to the President's extraordinarily refined and sensitive political instincts; let him continue to be, as long as possible, one hell of a good President determined to dispel the greatest fears of the American people. That's the best politics there could possibly be.

Third, and in keeping with the above, I suggest it is inappropriate to compartmentalize White House thinking in the manner suggested by your memo. I see no need for a change of any kind in Presidential stance from now until actual campaigning begins in late September or October 1. I see no need whatever for him to function any differently between the conventions than he is right now, nor should he do anything differently after the Republican Convention until he is forced to the hustings about October 1. And even then, when campaigning gets underway, I would pray that the shrillness and ad hominem stuff, and the direct parrying of opposition thrusts, would be left to the President's running mate and John Mitchell's minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential far more than political -- again, on the premise that a Presidential stance will prove to be the best politics. I naturally assume, in addition to the foregoing, that his campaigning will be interlarded with stints at the White House to make clear to the American people that the President is President first and only reluctantly, and temporarily, doing the domestic political thing.

Fourth, I have no way to lay out a proposed itinerary for the campaign at this time. I would assume that this would be governed by detailed political intelligence garnered from polls and political leaders in the various states and areas. Surely, however, the President will not be postured as a frantic candidate racing about the country desperately trying to corral votes -- and surely also, he will not be so scheduled as to flit wildly from coast to coast trying to visit every state.


I would anticipate a far more leisurely campaign directed at specific major voting blocs -- the ethnics, Catholics, Jews, agriculture, etc. -- and directed at specific geographical regions, using key states as the focal points of this kind of regional campaigning. I hope someone there agrees with me that we have tended of late to underestimate the enormous nationwide impact of a Presidential appearance, no matter whether he is speaking in Maine or Southern California. The national TV coverage of a Presidential appearance, wherever he speaks, makes every speech a national appearance, and I think it is awfully easy to overdo this. . . This is why I suggest that a short campaign will be more productive than the traditional two-month effort, and it is why I also envision a regional effort rather than a state-by-state kind of campaign of the 1960 style.

Fifth, as to the President's issues, I hardly see how these can change much from now through Election Day, though I must again confess that I lack authoritative data from polls and so on to gauge this accurately. It seems to me that we are back into the 1956 cycle, in which peace, prosperity and progress are the dominant concerns, and each of these is trending today in the President's favor. I recognize that there are sub-themes which your polls isolate, such as school busing, aid to parochial schools, environmentalism and such, but the controlling themes are now and ought to continue to be those three golden words of 1956 -- peace, prosperity and progress.

Finally, I suspect that the President has so defused most of the key issues either with actual achievements as in the foreign arena or with programs recommended to Congress that the opposition will be driven, in desperation, to a campaign of vilification that by election time will have degenerated into character assassination. I think the President should ignore all such vituperation, leaving it to his running mate and others to respond in kind; but it would be mere prudence, I should think, and as we discussed on Thursday, to conjure up a few explicit actions to demonstrate to the country

that the President and his Administration are plainly not captives of big business and that skullduggery, such as alleged about ITT, is merely a political slur and not in fact true. I am deeply convinced, especially if the opposition candidate is McGovern, that his major political overlay will be the charge of big business corruptly controlling the Administration at the expense of the average guy -- and in this time of disillusionment with government and almost everything else, that kind of campaigning can seduce lots of people.

But back to Square A. While I anticipate that this campaign will be very dirty before it is over, namely because the other side is devoid of viable issues, I believe that maintaining a Presidential stance throughout, and the conducting of a dignified and thoughtful campaign which will confirm the public judgment that the President is determined above all else to do only the right things for America, will turn out to be the road not only to victory in November, but also the road to a landslide.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bryce Harlow". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "B".

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: AL HAIG 

Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised in your memorandum of June 12:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Convention and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the development of a "Mr. & Mrs." team image which would not have been possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.

Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organizational arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of accomplishment.

I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.

EYES ONLY

This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor, Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?

Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions, I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken. That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and excessive campaign energy.

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing, aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the

Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which can come from scandal, setbacks in the international environment, or domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to develop compensatory neutralization programs.

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the following:

(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc. The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will therefore become moot.

(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.

(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the

Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be counted as a strong continuing asset.

(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to international trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.

(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly strong popular base.

On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY

WASHINGTON
June 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT: '72 CAMPAIGN

BETWEEN CONVENTIONS

The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party platform planks for ammunition -- although never publicly identified as such -- the President should focus on his compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused to pass.

I think the President can remain above the partisanship involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.

POST GOP CONVENTION

I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period, the President should, as much as is politically possible, maintain the posture of the professional, business-like Chief Executive going about his very important duties; and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at no time should the President drop to the level of the contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.

I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him, that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.

That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of the President be maintained regardless of how much or how little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition. That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function that would be politically desirable.

After the Convention, it seems to me that the President ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional and local Party officials to give them his personal marching orders. This should be done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely about what is going on, thereby providing for our own Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may be in the wind.

Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions. However, I still think that as much as possible, the image of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained as long as possible.

To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the President should be highly selective of the activities involving himself and that they should have a broader gauged raison d'etre other than partisan politics for as long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.

CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment. The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional stress on the economic issue.

I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling the concept that economic conditions in this country are good and that the economy will actually be better than our ability to convince the public of this fact.

I propose that we seriously create an almost separate, well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will be solely to create an image of economic well-being in this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it be done.

Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that this government has itself caught in a position where mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly career civil servants. This routine economic reporting is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that the economy is better than it seems to them.

As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are better off economically at this particular time than at any other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should ask their audiences to look inward and make their own judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer to that question is that indeed most people are better off now than ever before.

If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny. With the resources of this government, there is no excuse for there existing a single miniscule detail about George McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff and/or his mistress escaping us.

I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators who have already compiled everything there is to know about George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate. If there isn't, one should be established immediately.

There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we should do everything within our power to woo the American trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on congressional, state and local campaigns and should not be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is not even ideologically compatible with the principles of trade unionism.

To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election. I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise to see him deny labor's resources.

OPPOSITION STRATEGY

It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets: (1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an instinctive support from the liberal news media.

With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend it all in every area.

Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions

just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard, I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee should be established to hold regular press conferences and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.

We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel who commit documentable instances of being McGovern "sweethearts." I don't think the broad gauged attack is productive, but every time we can prove media bias or inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the specific error or article to which we are addressing.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (Per HRH)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960:

First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign." (If there is a single hallmark of RN's runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not so much lose votes from August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?

A) Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate, if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention, but not a Nixon voter at heart.

B) We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North, who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our opportunity is renewed.)

The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls. Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide" that might have been.

But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings in 1968. Basically, they were these:

a) A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.

Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing, he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.

On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges, to attract interest.

b) The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press. Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition, I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at election time.

What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story, The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two. Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through late in the game.

c) But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my view is:

THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964

If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:

- 1) We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order," and our issue hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
- 2) We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in 1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning is essential; plans are worthless." We should have a mapped-out game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at least once a week.
- 3) While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
- 4) We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the press and media between now and November. In my view, we have discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years -- indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc -- because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national polls by a single cubit.

5) We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.

In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent, we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.

Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this in mind.

To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues," clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Capers, which they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues and his positions -- and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."

6) One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of McGovern, if nominated, being cast into the role of "under-dog" "anti-Establishment," "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human interest than ours.

We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average Man against the Establishment and the Radical Chic.


Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles this will determine much. The media could treat McGovern like Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog" like HHH -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.

7) As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning." However Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.

8) Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities, Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that 20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of the North we never carried before.


9) Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.


Buchanan



Gallup Poll - 1960
 Nixon JFK Und.

Early June	48%	52%	
Late June	48	52	
July	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November	48	49	3





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE
SUBJECT: Campaign 72

Ray Price

I'd like to expand more fully in a subsequent memo on the points you asked my thoughts on in yours of June 12, but here for a starter:

1. Posture between the conventions: Still Presidential, statesmanlike, holding rigorously to his announced intention not to do political things until after the Republican convention. Take the position that there's work to be done running the country, and there will be time later for campaigning. McGovern, of course, will be hitting him, and probably hitting hard; during this period he should not answer directly, but rather let others do the hitting back while he goes about the people's business. Try to establish the sharpest possible contrast between RN the President and McGovern the politician.

2. Posture after the GOP Convention: Be a candidate, but continue to be President first and candidate second. Remember at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathetically and more positively as President than as campaigner. Keep campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies as possible. Rallies are bad TV -- too much phony hoopla, too much like a hard sell for Dr. Hoogan's Snake-Oil. Do some symbolic events that demonstrate concern with selected, identifiable problems, and that give an opportunity to say something specific about them. Use radio: the campaign itself will give the peg, the excuse, that's been lacking during this pre-campaign period. Remain Presidential; resist the temptation to respond in kind to the attacks that will be made. Have others

carry the attack -- and make maximum use of outside organizations, individuals and ad hoc committees to blast the opposition's crazier schemes. As the campaign draws to a close, let RN show increasing irritation not with attacks on him personally, but with the monkey-wrenches the opposition is throwing into the machinery of government, and -- depending on the nature of the opposition's campaign -- be prepared in the closing days to stand up on behalf of the nation and alert the electorate to the disaster that the accumulated nonsense of the campaign suggests a Democratic victory would visit on the United States, on the world, and on the next generation.

3. Issues, timing, points of attack, etc.: Assuming McGovern to be the nominee, I agree that we should try to nail him for his left-wing radicalism -- but his vulnerability in this regard is not so much on an ideological basis as it is in what the positions he's staked out reveal about his basic preconceptions and his sloppy thinking: we should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the way that they feared a Goldwater Presidency -- which wasn't so much a matter of disagreeing with him on the issues as it was fearing that his approaches revealed a shallowness and a shoot-from-the-hip tendency that the Nation can't afford in the Presidency.

McGovern of course will be more careful -- but if he does start a dance toward the center we can hit him not only as an instinctive extremist, but also as one who leaps before he looks, and only afterwards tries to climb back out of the hole he's fallen into. That's not what people want in a President.

We should try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical positions -- on the assumption that he's going to back off, as he already has begun to do. Our aim should be fourfold:

-- To cement the identification of him with positions that are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained;

-- To make it clear, when he does back off, that he is backing off, not merely "clarifying;"

-- To plant the impression that he too readily embraces schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he's not only radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted with the power of the Presidency.

-- To undermine his image (which is a great part of his strength) as a plain spoken prairie preacher who, by God, at least says what he thinks -- and to show him as an opportunist who follows the polls, which will cut directly to one of his principal issues: trust.

4. Opposition strategy and how we should meet it: They'll probably portray RN as insensitive to human needs; as calous toward the poor, the black, the young, the working man; as a war President, who needlessly sacrificed 10,000 lives in Vietnam. Heavy emphasis on the economy, on which it looks as though we'll still be vulnerable -- jobs, inflation, taxes.

A central part of the opposition campaign will be a focus on trust, with the theme that you can't trust RN: that he's a calculating political manipulator, who uses the Presidency for polirical purposes first and for public purposes second; the President of ITT of secret campaign contributors, of big business, for the big guys and against the little guy.

I think we've got to be very careful about backlash to some of the issues we've been staking out. For example, pushing too hard on marijuana could cost us California, with its huge youth vote (including those out-of-State students who'll be voting in California). This is even more of a gut issue to them than it is to their anti-pot elders; and I also think there are a hell of a lot of parents who don't like the idea of their kids smoking pot, but like the idea of their being thrown in jail for it even less. I suspect that people are getting a lot more sophisticated now about the distinctions between marijuana and hard drugs, and thus more sympathetic to the argument (which I think is true) that criminal penalties for use of pot increase rather than decrease hard drug usage. Similarly, the right to abortion is a highly emotional gut issue for millions of women, of all political

persuasions, and a lot of them are getting very angry at us -- and there are more women who vote than there are conservative Catholics. If we don't nuance our stands on these and similarly cross-cutting issues with a sufficient sensitivity to the feelings of the other side, we can get in real trouble.

As for how to meet the opposition strategy, the basic way is to do our best to keep the campaign on our issues: proven performance, world statesman, remember how bad things were in '68 (Don't Let Them Do It Again), don't take a chance on McGovern. We've got a great thing going with the summits as the first big step in a series that can only be completed by the man who started it off -- Give Peace a Chance -- Don't Throw It Away. One counter to the "trust" issue is to be doubly careful not to let another ITT-type thing crop up between now and election; another is to make it our issue by focusing a spotlight on McGovern's race from previous stands to popular stands.

Essentially, though, I think our strongest pitch is a larger reflection of the theme of Rockefeller's highly successful "Governor Rockefeller for Governor" campaign in 1966: "President Nixon for President." The central focus of our campaign should be on one thing: to make people proud of their President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: HARRY S. DENT *HSD*
SUBJECT: 1972 Campaign Suggestions

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

The President essentially should continue the present strategy of being a professional President working to solve national and international problems. From now until the GOP convention would be a good time to show personal emphasis on domestic programs and problems. This period might be right for some non-political type travelling to important states not to be visited in the campaign--appearances to big and key groups such as the national Jaycees Convention we just passed up under the post-summit strategy.

Surrogates should begin hammering away on the Demo ticket and the issues.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel..., where..., what type...?

The President's posture from the GOP Convention through the election should be much in the Eisenhower style as contrasted with the Truman style. The approach should be one of humility and dignity, with the President ignoring the enemy. Leave him to the surrogates and others. The President should address himself in appearances to his vision of the

kind of America and world he envisions for 1976 and further down the road--the theme of which would be "don't change horses in the middle of this dream."

Of course, the President would envision an America with a realistic and lasting peace abroad secured by a sufficient national security posture; domestic tranquility, based on fairness and justice for all, and firmness in law enforcement; rising prosperity and stable prices; and continued individual freedoms. These aims could be made to contrast with the Demo record of the past and the policies advocated by the opponent, in the right way.

The President should begin campaigning not later than mid-September. Our forces should emphasize our desire for a short campaign in the public interest. We should start this line now to put the Demos on the defensive as having campaigned for the job too long, especially McGovern.

Travel should cover every one of the key eleven states and at least two big rallies in each region so no area should feel written-off or taken for granted. The regional rallies could be in lieu of visits to some of the key states if 19 visits would be deemed too much. However, 19 or 20 visits should be a minimum, unless the polls show a good victory.

The campaigning by the President should not be very partisan and should avoid local ticket entanglements as much as possible without hurting the candidates, especially key prospects, or local party morale. Having the State-wide and/or Congressional slate on the stage might be necessary.

Each regional rally should be regionally televised. At these affairs, the President could be honored with key leader testimonials and in other ways, so that the President has to do little in the way of appearing to be a politician. He should be depicted as the statesman building a better and more stable USA and world.

Appearances in the key states could be varied, depending on

the type forums or activities available or which could be created to fit the circumstances of the time and place.

3. General thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

All the attacking should be done by the surrogates and others. Our strategy should be to lay the McGovern statements, policies and record on the line through speakers and advertising. We should lay out a steady stream of McGovernisms to keep the attacks fresh, but also repetitious enough to saturate with the points. He should be shown as the advocate of surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and appeaser of lawless elements. Moreover, he and his party leaders should be charged with undermining the President's efforts for peace, especially the Senate Demo caucus vote to condemn the President in a time of international crisis (mining). We should contrast peace through strength with peace through surrender. Also, responsibility versus irresponsibility. Much emphasis should be placed on stability, individual and national security, and public safety.

The major concerns in all the polls revolve around personal security--peace, economic security, and law and order. The Nixon record is strong in all of these, but it needs public saturation in every good detail.

Presidential leadership, experience, expertise, and realism should also be stressed. Richard Nixon--the man for these times, based on a solid record of performance under very adverse circumstances and against a stacked deck on Capitol Hill (especially Presidential candidates), the press (care here to except good guys), and as the leader of the minority party (outnumbered 5-3). Many people still don't realize all the obstacles in the President's path.

Timing of the attack strategy will have to depend on developments, but the McGovern record should be aired from

the time of his nomination all the way through. Pat Buchanan's compendium on his positions and statements should be helpful in stretching out the attacks.

We must make peace through strength the No. 1 issue--that this determines the success of everything else. The big line of difference should be drawn on this issue.

4. Thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

The opposition strategy will turn on these major points: Vietnam, tax reform, haves vs. have-nots, unemployment, cost of living, credibility, Southern Strategy, insensitivity to the needs and desires of people (anti-people).

If we do our job offensively on the peace through strength theme, then we will have largely blunted the Vietnam charges. Also, a conclusion there would end the debate and the campaign.

Also, our overall offensive strategy of laying out the President's solid record of achievements could blunt most of the Demo attacks. For instance, on the economy, we have the employment figures (6 million more than in 1968), the CPI index difference, and the surging GNP figures to positively make our case. On unemployment we must do more to show that the higher percentage today is due to the influx of women and youngsters into the job markets and point up the change from a war to a peacetime economy. With war we can get unemployment statistics down but casualties back up (jobs vs. lives).

Southern Strategy when it does come up can be answered with many facts--the leadership to desegregate without bullets, blood and bitterness, full participation administration with all the black, chicano, women, et al, appointments contrasted with previous, ending of sectionalism and bias against South, etc. Bob Brown and I can put together a paper on this.

Trying to pit the have-nots vs. the haves can be made into a positive issue for us by accusing them of class warfare-- also, they have promoted race vs. race and section vs. section, all ended now under RN.

Tax reform can be blunted some by the class warfare attack. Also, we can feed out to outside public conduits information that disproves McGovern's mis-statements about some of the loopholes and make the case that most loopholes are the ones all Americans enjoy. We should not get ourselves in the position of defending sensitive loopholes. Fortunately, McGovern's extremism with his tax proposals should enable us to discredit many of his tax reform thrusts.

Credibility can be shored up by doing some things, based on opportunities, that further underscore the President's credibility and get them well publicized. The record of withdrawals in VN is a good example of keeping his word. Platform fulfillments as Rhodes lays out can be used. In fact, we should put together a group to work on ferreting out examples to be highlighted and publicized. This means also finding ways to stress the President's personal characteristics. The same applies for the anti-sensitive and anti-people charges. Show he has compassion through anecdotes and publicized public demonstrations. What he did for the new attorney general at the swearing in and how much it meant to his family.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DOUGLAS HALLETT

SUBJECT:

Your Memo of June 12.

The following is in response to the four questions raised in your June 12 memorandum:

1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues -- particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conventions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour -- i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc. in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as possible, do an address on incomes vs. services strategy before a prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform, sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The President should also do something on the human and personal side -- perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation spas.

The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months. Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presidential. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically governmental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then, offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side. The over-all theme -- which can be related to our foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed, sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly anti-governmental.

2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970 one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he comes back, his campaign pace should not be much, if any, faster than his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken. The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or statement tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues. The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be met with no less than 200,000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,

the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented (one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute "Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran, a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids. Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices, education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversation leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural, peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i. e. Nixon and Jews -- and negative -- i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should be used by front groups in particular areas.

The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others, but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968. Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.

3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while maintaining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberals care about words more than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues -- amnesty, defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very carefully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about abortion can only help McGovern by making us seem silly for relying on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there, nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges -- i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's \$110,000 home, etc. -- should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially Eastern Establishment liberalism.

On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues, welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation, through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral vote count. And since it is possible -- and since it is the only possible way he could win -- we should worry about countering McGovern's potential

appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no choice but to vote for us -- and whose support can be reinforced by the kinds of covert operation suggested above.

Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsible, positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either irresponsible and counter-productive -- his defense budget -- or that they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our surrogate speakers.

It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i. e. Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The temptation, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community and sect efforts, to be positive -- and to keep it that way we have to be especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to embody change and we cannot do that if we are demagoguing -- the media, McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of demagoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establishment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only basis on which he can possibly win.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1972.

confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT: Campaign

You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff, etc., and I will not belabor that point.

Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E. Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.

1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists," as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-nothing 80th Congress." With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation -- in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public interest.

If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.

2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.

For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.

I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning. It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Convention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into "I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes."

We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either; the President should begin to say now, well before the convention, that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the electorate for support -- by so doing, he shows respect for the system that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.

Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:

If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews: Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee ever -- and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175,000 of those wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan, about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on oldtimers who have a defeatist attitude about Nixon and Jews -- this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.

We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should, for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every week between now and November. We tend to think of our Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh chance there.

I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (Whenever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.) The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemployment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a smart opponent.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

Point 1: What should be the President's posture between conventions?

In my mind, there is no question but that the President should remain "the President" not only between conventions but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late in the campaign as possible, the President should be a "working President," remain mostly in Washington attending to the business of the nation.

From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be ripened for Administration support. Careful use of Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the stage to capture these disaffected voters.

Point 2: What should be the President's posture during the campaign?

Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe should be the keystone of most of the early campaign. Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney." The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided. We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President does move, it will have a heightened impact.

Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the President's position -- up to a point. In order to orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have better communication with campaign headquarters and the White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking world events.

As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates" should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic nominees will be formulating their strategy during that period and the Administration will have an opportunity to capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher percentage of their votes.

These early efforts should be limited to specific constituencies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early, especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type campaign, are all too real.

With the base already established, we should use the Republican Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's re-election. With special mailings, highly structured organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President, building in momentum, until the President himself does decide to enter the lists.

Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?

To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs and issues sort out under these two broad headings.

The media would have us believe many Americans are totally dissatisfied with the "old Politics." It is now the fashion to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists. That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment," i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class

Americans have obtained a standard of living that their parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the midst of their success many middle class (and especially lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse, busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health care. For many of these voters irritation has led to frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a visceral reaction against the "ins."

These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or the security of strong leadership. The President has laid the groundwork brilliantly for this case.

An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration achievements and proposals can advance the image of responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the fullest.

The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract support. We should not be seduced into attempting a "charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the President accurately display the courageous and bold qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real results because the President bargains from strength.

Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food" and "unemployment." The food cost affects every American family and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we can do about food costs except what has been done and obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting the voters to think about other issues.

Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy. Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.

Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.

A McGovern candidacy will cause divisions in his party that even an attractive running mate will not repair. The South, for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the McGovern organization in the South will admit.

A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes in industrial states where the election might be close. But some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help the re-election of the President where he does appear on the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters will support Wallace.

As we saw in the televised debates during the California primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total lack of ability to lead this nation.

Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package. The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. ~~McGovern's programs will require higher taxes.~~ If the Administration can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push him categorically into far left field, we can turn the onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: The Odds Against Henry Jackson

That Senator Jackson is a candidate for his party's nomination -- there is no question. That he can win it -- there appears little hope. But Jackson has some very high cards to play which make him a strong contender for Vice President, and a powerful force at the Democratic National Convention.

JACKSON'S STRENGTHS

1. He has almost all the moderate and conservative columnists in the palm of his hand. They like, admire and respect Scoop Jackson. A cursory review of the last three months finds supportive presidential talk about Jackson from columnists White, both Alsops, Kilpatrick, Alexander, Cuneo, the Drummonds several times, Gould Lincoln, Chamberlain, Wilson -- and on and on. (Evans & Novak are solicitous.) They provide him with regular backpage support in most of the papers of the nation. Even columnists who disagree with him (Wicker, Viorst) respect him.

2. A choice not an echo: He is the single national Democrat who stands as a clear alternative against the crowd of Bayh, Hughes, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey, Kennedy crowd. He emerges thus a visible rallying point for conservative Democrats at the '72 convention.

3. Having hired the capable adviser Ben Wattenburg, he is paralleling the Scammon-Wattenburg thesis. His attacks on "environmental extremists," his denunciation of fellow Democrats for paying "homage to the radical fringe," his focus on bread-and-butter issues, the economy and jobs, his call for Democrats to stay on the "Economic Issue," not the war; his rough terminology which is being described in liberal circles as "Agnewian" -- in all these instances, Jackson is setting himself up against the trendy,

bell-bottomed, elite of the left wing of his party -- and with the working man center and right of his party. On issues, he is carving out his own independent sector within the Democratic Party.

4. His super-hawkish anti-Soviet stand in the Middle East, his fight for SST, against the "environmental extremists," for space and defense, not only make him first choice of George Meany -- but guarantee a well-financed campaign from Aerospace, from Defense Industries, from the Jewish Community, from Big Labor.

5. He is well respected by his Senate colleagues. A Drummond Poll of the Senate found that 18 percent of Democrats felt Jackson "most qualified to be President" ahead of Humphrey -- second only to Muskie -- (interestingly, EMK got less than anyone, three percent or one vote of those polled.)

6. He gets excellent press coverage.

7. His hard-line on the Soviets, and on strategic defense, wins him publicity plaudits from the Republican Conservative Community. While such is of little use in a run for the nomination, it might be to any Democrat for his Vice President.

8. On Vietnam he is down-playing his support of the President, leaving it high enough to be visibly opposed to the rest of the pack, but shading it a bit. Domestically, he pays occasional obeisance to such myths as the "repression" by the Administration. Enough to keep his dues up -- but not nearly enough to close the sizable gap that exists between him and the liberal left of his party.

9. He is the best vote-getter in the Senate -- winning his primary against a Galbraithian type by 85 percent -- and beating our candidate in the general by the same margin -- 85 percent of the vote in a northwestern industrial state. This evidence of massive support across the party lines and throughout the ideological spectrum makes him especially attractive as a Vice Presidential nominee.

10. His strength with press was evident in a poll of editors at ASNE who felt he would probably have nearly best chance of any Democrat of defeating RN.

DEFICIENCIES

1. He has almost no recognition nationally. This will force him to raise his profile rapidly, to announce fairly early, and probably to go the primary route -- and it is doubtful how well he can do against Democrats like Muskie.

2. He is apparently an unexciting speaker, who often bores even those audiences who agree with him. One friend called him a "Barry Goldwater without charisma."

3. His nomination would sunder the Democratic Party. And with left-wing strength greater at this convention than the past, difficult to see how his nomination could be swallowed by a Democratic Convention. (However, if a Teddy Kennedy were nominated and Democratic conservatives sufficiently outraged -- a Kennedy-Jackson ticket might do for the party what the Kennedy-Johnson ticket did in 1960, bring it together again. Where Johnson had the opposition of Labor and support of the South -- Jackson for Veep would have both the South and Labor in his corner.)

4. He is sixty years old, at least will be, when the Democratic Convention is over. This is his last chance to be on a national Democratic ticket, after three decades in the Senate.

JACKSON'S CHANCE

Having carved out an independent Churchillian Position, if you will, on the Soviets, on the Middle East -- whence war is likely to come if it comes -- Jackson is dependent upon circumstances. If the Vietnam war is raging, and there is calm between East and West -- Jackson has next to nothing going for him.

But if Vietnam is removed as an issue, and the Soviets become belligerent in Europe or the Middle East or the Mediterranean or anywhere, then Jackson may very well appear the man for the times. If national focus turns upon American weakness in the face of a rapidly arming Soviet Empire, then Jackson could generate real support among Conservative Democrats, Many unions and the South -- and even conservative Republicans.

No other Democrat seems today capable of making credible a hard-line policy against the USSR.

But in such times Jackson will have a long shot for the top position, and an inside track for the Vice Presidency.

THE FLORIDA PRIMARY

Jackson cannot win in New Hampshire; his lack of public recognition requires him to step out early if he is to have any hope at the Convention. Thus he is forced, it seems into the primaries. Thus Florida -- according to two writers -- which is the same day as New Hampshire -- becomes crucial to Jackson.

If Jackson wins in Florida, and Muskie is defeated, then the Muskie opening day becomes a flop; Muskie's candidacy is damaged; the Jackson candidacy becomes interesting -- and the stage is set for a bitter division at the Convention.

While we may be desirous ourselves of having a massive turnout for RN in Florida -- there may be something worth while for us in assisting the efforts of Scoop Jackson in that State. Something we ought to keep in mind.

