

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
37	2	9/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From MacGregor to Haldeman. RE California bumper strips. 3pgs.
37	2	6/9/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to President. RE EMK-political memo. 6 pgs.
37	2	6/9/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dent to Haldeman. RE Wallace candidacy. 5 pgs.
37	2	6/25/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman. RE Lou Harris Poll. 4 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
37	2	6/25/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman. RE Lou Harris Poll. 4 pgs.
37	2	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Strachan. RE Strachan to Haldeman memo on Key States. 15 pgs.
37	2	6/14/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harper to Ehrlichman. RE Issues of interest to swing voters. 12 pgs.
37	2	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE Magruder meeting with AG. 28 pgs.
37	2	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE RNC Delaware study. 8 pgs.



<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
37	2	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Woods. RE Delaware survey. 7 pgs.
37	2		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Book	What Really Decides an Election booklet. 32 pgs.
37	2	1/6/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman. RE Trouble on the Right. 17 pgs.
37	2	1/21/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to Haldeman. Reorganization of RNC. 9 pgs.
37	2	5/3/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to President. RE Political memo the PR Campaign. 5 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
37	2	4/19/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Mitchell to Haldeman. RE Young Volunteers for Nixon. 30 pgs.
37	2	7/12/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Shumway to Benham. RE Newspapers, Bureaus in Washington. 22 pgs.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman  
Box Number: 318

Folder: [Campaign 25 Part III Sept. 5-Folder 2]

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
72	Return Private/Political Note, MacGregor to HRH, 9-8-72
73	Return Private/Political Memo, Buchanan to the President, 6-9-71
74	Return Private/Political Note, Dent to HRH, 6-9-71
75	Return Private/Political Memo, Colson to HRH, 6-25-71
76	Return Private/Political Memo, Colson to HRH, 6-25-71
77	Return Private/Political Note, Higby to G.S., n.d.
78	Return Private/Political Memo, Harper to JDE, 6-14-71
79	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
80	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-17-71
81	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Woods, 6-17-71
82	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Woods, 6-17-71
83	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Woods, 6-17-71
84	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Woods, 6-17-71
85	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Woods, 6-17-71
86	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Woods, 6-17-71
87	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Woods, 6-17-71
88	Return Private/Political "What Really Decides an..." 1971
89	Return Private/Political Memo, Buchanan to HRH, 1-6-71
90	Return Private/Political Memo, Magruder to the AG & HRH, 1-21-71
91	Retain Open
92	Return Private/Political Memo, Buchanan to the President, 5-3-71
93	Return Private/Political Memo, Mitchell to HRH, 4-19-71
94	Return Private/Political Ltr, Shumway to Benham, 7-12-71
95	Retain Open

**Committee  
for the Re-election  
of the President**

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920

September 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

CLARK MacGREGOR

FROM:

FRED MALEK 

SUBJECT:

California and Bumper Strips

On September 6th Larry Higby asked for a report to Bob Haldeman on what we were doing on the bumper strips in California (see attached).

In the month of August alone, 196,000 of the new bumper strips were delivered to California. An additional 91,000 have been sent out from our Fullerton distribution center so far this month. Therefore, the supply is quite adequate at this point, and we will be sending them more bumper strips as the needs continue to develop.

With regard to distribution, the major effort so far has been centered around large sports events. For example, the Young Voters for the President group distributed huge quantities at the California 500 in San Bernadino County on August 31st. Other major sports events will be covered in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego (e.g., Chargers and Rams games). We are also considering a bumper blitz either tied in with the Canvass Kick-Off or occurring thereafter. This would consist of the Youth groups being organized to hit parking lots, shopping centers, and other public areas.

In short, I feel at this point that the supply of bumper strips to California is adequate and that the distribution effort underway or planned will ensure that they are used in a visible manner.

Attachment

cc: Jeb Magruder

September 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : JEB MAGRUDER  
FRED MALEK

FROM : L. HIGBY *L*

It was rather disturbing that on our recent trip to California we failed to see one Nixon bumper strip, except for one on Paul Presley's car, the Manager of the San Clemente Inn. We've talked about this before, particularly about getting them distributed in the primary states immediately, and obviously this is not taking place if we're unable to even find bumper strips in Orange County!

Therefore, Bob has requested that we get a concentrated campaign going immediately to get out the President Nixon bumper strips -- don't use the Reelect the President ones. Bob feels this would be an excellent project for our young people to hit parking lots on certain days, perhaps for example, the 15th of September. As we've learned in the past, we don't hand them out at rallies because people don't put them on, they will only take them home and put them on their mirrors.

Bob asked that you let him know what's being done on this by Friday, September 8.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DETERMINED TO BE AN

ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12066, Section 6-102

By Emp Date 4-7-82CONFIDENTIAL

June 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: EMK - POLITICAL MEMORANDUM

A careful analysis of news clippings of recent weeks, coupled with reports of recent days, removes, I think, vestigial doubts that EMK is running actively for the Presidency.

Items:

Last night on the Elizabeth Drew show, Kennedy pointedly refused to issue any Sherman statements. In April, for the first time, he stated "I am keeping my mind open" about the nomination. ABC finds that he has written to former top aides indicating he is assessing the situation. Humphrey thinks he is a potential active candidate, as does Muskie. Daley, according to HHH, is "strong for Teddy." Riesel claims nearly all the top AFL-CIO types, excepting Meany, are holding back, waiting for Teddy; the same is true of many political pros around the country, according to Jerry Greene. Andrew Tully said a month or more ago that anyone who doesn't think Teddy is running "suffers from rocks in the head," and Andy Biemiller of AFL-CIO indicates that if a fellow does not think Kennedy is running, he is "nuts".

Buchanan's View: Kennedy is keeping his options open -- against the possibility that RN may be so strong by summer '72 that the nomination will not be worth anything. In which event, he can stay out. However, at this point, he and his people have obviously concluded RN can be beaten -- and they are not about to sit this one out -- risking spending eight years outside the inner circle of power of a President Humphrey or a President Muskie. If Kennedy believes the Democrats can win -- as he quite apparently does now -- he will go after the nomination. If he thinks the Democrats by spring of 1972 are sure losers, he can yet stand off.

CONFIDENTIAL

Hard Evidence:

Mankiewicz, Salinger, Goodwin and Walinsky have all hooked up (CSM) with sure-loser George McGovern. These are not idealistic school boys willing to spend a year of their lives on an ideological lark. They are interested in power -- there is no power to be had by going the route with George McGovern.

It appears they have been given the go-sign by Kennedy to join McGovern, that the purpose is to serve (a) as a "holding operation" for the Kennedy staff, (b) to make top Kennedy personnel familiar with all the levers of state Democratic power when Kennedy makes his move and (c) to elevate McGovern in the polls and start cutting Humphrey and Muskie down to size where they can't be nominated.

McGovern is now moving in line with this strategy, with his overt violation of O'Brien's 11th Commandment and attack on HHH and Muskie for opposition to the Mansfield Amendment. Last night, Kennedy himself had the needle out for some of the "older" voices locked in the thinking of the past -- and he mentioned, specifically, the opposition to Mansfield Amendment as his basis -- refusing, however, to name names.

Also, in line with the strengthening of the weak sister, McGovern, is the emergence of candidates Jackson and Mills -- both of whom will corral conservative Democrat delegates who might otherwise be in the Muskie or Humphrey Camp.

Kennedy Strategy:

Avoid the early primaries in which the left-handers McGovern, Bayh, Hughes, etc. will all be knocked out of the box in the early innings -- freeing up their "Kennedyites" for the switch to Teddy. Maneuver to guarantee that neither Muskie nor Humphrey moves into the convention with the nomination locked up. Hold open the option of going into the California Primary itself -- if that is necessary to halt the momentum of a Muskie or Humphrey. Nearing convention time -- have the left candidates, one-by-one, throw their support to Teddy and Teddy emerge as

the single champion of that wing of the party -- with good labor backing, with good machine backing, and with young, poor, black unanimous behind his candidacy.

Muskie versus Kennedy:

Since November Muskie has lost almost 40 percent of his first-choice support among Democrats, dropping from 33-21.

Between March and May, Muskie's 1 point lead among Democrats over Kennedy (26-25) disappeared into an eight point deficit (29-21).

Among Independents -- Muskie's long suit -- his March lead over Kennedy of 18 points (31-13) was sliced all the way to four points (19-15).

Muskie still has tremendous support among Democratic Party leaders -- Kennedy, from the polls, next to nothing -- but Kennedy support among the rank-and-file Democrats, his ability to attract publicity and generate excitement and the support of the ideologically committed give him more than enough to balance off his weakness with the pros.

Impossible for me to believe the Kennedyites, who believe RN is vulnerable, are going to sit by and watch a Muskie or Humphrey take the prize in August -- and perhaps the Presidency, thus putting off the "Restoration" for four years, possibly eight, possibly forever.

The Kennedy Assets:

These are well known. Charm, "commitment", affinity with the young, polish, Kennedy looks, mystique, the Myth, charisma along the campaign trail; he generates enormous excitement -- as is attested by GOPers traveling with him.

Deficiencies:

1. Even his best friends never accused Kennedy of being an intellectual. On the Drew show, he tended to retreat into the New Left cliches, "we can build a better America," material, which



reflects a lack of depth. Further, he tends to react somewhat hotly to attack. (PJB suggestion is that it might be well to have hang one or two on him -- from the Vice President or Dole -- taking some particular excessive statement, and really putting it to him, to ascertain how he handles himself. This would perhaps best be done by a moderate-liberal Senator who would unleash a stinging attack on him -- away from the Senate floor -- before television, about two-minutes of good work -- then we could see how he reacts.)

2. His far-left foreign policy positions, which win him the plaudits of the New Left journalists and fellow travelers in the media -- should be portrayed as shocking, alarming, frightening, dangerous to the peace, inviting war in Europe, "immature" and irresponsible. Not, of course, from here -- but in backgrounders with press, he should be portrayed as too reckless, too immature, too irresponsible, at his age, to be President of the United States. This fits hand in glove with the impression he has left upon much of the country and the center of the Democratic Party in the wake of Chappaquiddick.

It is the quiet constant repetition of private and public comments like, "Sure, Muskie is strong but this 'indecisive' thing is killing him" that is itself injuring Muskie's chances. He has been unable to shake the "indecisive" charge with which we have -- with his help -- tagged him.

3. His far left social policy positions should be broadcast and re-broadcast. He has the Left and the Radical Kids. We don't and won't get a one. The effort should be to identify him with them, to associate him with them, to tie him to them.

No matter that EMK is adored by the Party's Left, we have a serious problem only if he gets well with the Party's Center. The more he acts like Brother Bobby the better off we are; the less he acts like brother John, the better off we are.

4. Socially, Kennedy is out of touch with the political mood. The Jet Set, Swinger, See-Through Blouse cum Hot Pants crowd, the Chappaquiddick Hoe-down and Paris highjinks -- the more publicity they all get, the better. (The pictures of the Kennedy sisters, in mod attire, at the Kennedy Center, did them no good.)

Chappaquiddick:

This, of course, will be kept in the public mind by the press -- speculating on whether it is helping or hurting EMK. We ought to stay miles away from it -- indicating even in private, "it's hard to say the effect; we don't know."

Racial Issue:

Kennedy's support of the social-engineering Ribicoff Plan should be emphasized -- and a check made to determine how many of his own children go to integrated schools -- and then this fact, if relevant, placed in Monday, or some publication to get attention. Monday could investigate this -- if Kennedy is guilty of hypocrisy on the question -- this made known.

The Democratic Right:

EMK openly endorsed the left-wing Mayoral candidate who lost to Rizzo in the primary by a whopping margin. The President might well congratulate Rizzo -- if and when he wins the Mayorality -- and try to wean some of these tough-line conservative Mayor types to a position of neutrality in a Kennedy-RN contest.

They have no reason to love EMK -- and it would appear to me that this effort would be at least as worthwhile as the effort to woo labor chieftains equally locked into the Democratic Party.

JFK:

Since EMK will be trafficking on the JFK myth, it would be well to document JFK's tough line on Defense, foreign policy, Vietnam, Europe, etc. over against EMK's positions -- to provide conservative Democrats with some rationale for abandoning the little brother of their hero.

Some of the above are tactical gestures, rather than strategic planning. But the main objective, again, is to keep Kennedy out on the Far Left of his Party -- to prevent his major inroads into the center -- so that if he is the nominee against the President -- we have a clear shot at all those conservative Democrats, who make

up an integral part of the Nixon Majority. If he is nominated, it should be by the Left Wing of his Party so that LBJ, the South, and the Conservative Democrats will feel they have been run over top of by the unrepresentative radicals and the elite.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: June 9, 1971

TO: BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: HARRY DENT *HD*

Please handle \_\_\_\_\_

For your information \_\_\_\_\_

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1971

TO: Harry Dent

FROM: Wallace Henley

SUBJECT: Ramifications of a Wallace candidacy.

Background:

Two schools of thought prevail regarding a Wallace candidacy in 1972. One of these is that a Wallace candidacy would hurt the President by siphoning away important votes. The other school holds that a Wallace candidacy would not hurt the President, but might actually help him by casting the President as a clear centrist wedged between a liberal Democrat and a rightist Wallace, and by drawing votes away from (other) Democratic candidates.

Critique:

In my view, the theory that a Wallace candidacy would not hurt the President is wrong. I think George Wallace in the race in 1972 would present a danger to the President in some tight areas, and would help to elect the Democratic candidate. I think the idea that Wallace wouldn't hurt the President stems from several misinterpretations, as follows:

- 1) The position assumes that Wallace Democrats are making an effort to remain partisan, and simply see Wallace as a Democratic alternative.

While there may be question over the validity of major Party realignment, there is little question but that some decomposition of basic Party loyalty is occurring. The Wallace phenomenon, riding the surge of some of the most divisive issues in our history, has contributed to Party decomposition. Running nationally as an Independent, he spurred many voters to seriously rethink their philosophy of Party loyalty. Those who vote for George Wallace vote for George Wallace, not the American Independent Party, or the Democratic Party, or whatever symbol under which he may be running.

- 2) The position assumes, therefore, that if Wallace is not in the race, most of his supporters will vote the Democratic ticket.

Wallace supporters are people who respond deeply to the populism he hurls. They are emotion-motivated voters who feel deeply enough about their conservatism and sock-it-to-the-Establishmentism that they are willing to risk whatever labels they may accrue as a Wallace voter ("racist", etc.). It is illogical to assume that, in the absence of Wallace, these voters would casually shift to a Democrat with liberal credentials. They are much more likely to move to the candidate they see embodying at least some of their ideology. That would be the candidate of the center. In our case, that candidate would be Richard Nixon.

- 3) The position assumes that the bulk of voters have the sophistication and desire to understand centrism and to make a choice on that basis.

While there are many voters who attach themselves to what they define as a "moderate", most are unable to cope with the subtle implications of governing style as reflected in ideological style. Most attach themselves to bread and butter issues, and tend to respond to the personality which overwhelms them the most on such points. It is simply too much to assume that more voters would flock to the centrist Nixon because Wallace is in the race. Those who would turn to a centrist Nixon from a liberal Democrat are likely to do so anyway. A genuine centrist will not vote for Wallace. So, apart from image, it would seem that a Wallace candidacy only affords Nixon borderliners somewhere else to go.

#### Toward a Wallace Strategy:

There are several options that could be pursued, as follows:

- 1) Ignore the possibility of a Wallace candidacy.

- 2) Try to work a deal with Wallace.
- 3) Get him out of the race by discrediting him, making it impossible for him to run.

In my view, it would be courting danger to ignore Wallace. I am convinced he is running, despite urgings to the contrary from some of his friends. He's trying to get hold of the Alabama Democratic Party apparatus, attending fund-raisers and making the other sounds of a candidate.

Working a deal with Wallace is a touchy affair. It must be remembered that he is not an issues candidate, and no trade-off on ideology would dissuade him from running. He is a compulsive runner, and only enlarges his base of wealth each time he runs. He has a tendency to renege on deals - as in the promise to Albert Brewer that he wouldn't run for Governor. And after he has reneged, he loves to get the word out that a "poor little ole country boy tricked those fat cats." This could damage the President throughout the nation.

I believe the heart of our Wallace strategy ought to be to discredit him. Our first effort should be to discredit him on his home ground - Alabama and the South. This would be done with the hope of sparking a public outcry to keep him out of the race - the only thing that is likely to keep him from running. But there must also be an effort to discredit him nationally. Many and company are still concerned about the impact he is making among rank and file labor folks, and I think this is indicative he still has some support nationwide.

Wallace might be discredited in the following ways:

- 1) The people of the South in particular must be persuaded that a vote for Wallace is a vote for a liberal Democrat. There is only one thing more reprehensible to a Wallace voter other than not voting for George: that is voting for a liberal Democrat. We have to convince them of the danger through a flood of proof items - like statistics.

Mr. Dent

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- 2) Nationally, it must be shown that George Wallace's record shows he has no real skill at governing. Publication of exposes of crime and disorder during the Wallace administrations, plus an intensive look at Alabama's taxes, educational system, etc., might do the job here.

A Final Note:

George Wallace is highly skilled at running as the underdog. He elicits much support from his emotional followers. Whatever is done must go through remote parties, not traceable to a national candidate or Party. Nor should the discrediting be done in an overt style against George Wallace the man, but against George Wallace the candidate and Governor.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

C.P.

June 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *WCZ*  
SUBJECT: Lou Harris Poll

Lou Harris has done an indepth analysis of Ted Kennedy which will be the subject of several Harris columns over the next several weeks. The analysis is based on an indepth survey of 1614 eligible voters conducted between June 9 and 15.

It is Harris' considered judgment that Ted Kennedy, if nominated, will lose the election in a most divisive campaign. Harris says there is a very unusual phenomenon with respect to the Kennedy candidacy poll that doesn't occur with any other Democrat; he arouses bitter hostility or ardent support but rarely any lukewarm reactions.

Eight statements were presented to interviewees. Both answers and then indepth comments were analyzed. Therefore, part of the following is statistical and part of it is Harris' editorial analysis of the comments.

On the strong side, Kennedy comes out 68-20 positive on the question of whether he is a good senator who works hard. Harris feels that he would be hard to attack on the issues or on his record in the Senate.

A second positive point is that he is considered by a 51-34 rating "one of the few politicians willing to take courageous stands on issues that are before the country". Harris points out that this is a two edged sword. People may admire his courage in opposing the Washington police during May Day, for example, but still vote against him.

It does not mean they agree with him. The breakdown of this category goes as follows:

Catholics	60-26
Blacks	77-8
Young	52-34
College Educated	41-47 (a surprise)
Independents	47-40

In the next category, Harris asked a loaded, but highly significant, question: "One day, he should run for President, but he's not ready for it now." The public agreed 58-29. The interpretation is that he is considered a Presidential candidate but is also considered immature and not ready for the Presidency now.

And the most important question of all: "Does he have the personality and leadership qualities a President should have?" 34% say yes, 51 say no. Significantly, he is weakest on this in the West (27 yes, 62 no), among college educated (23-64) and among Independents (28-56). Among youth he is 36-48 (a real surprise). In the East 38-46; Mid-West 38-47; South 31-52; among Catholics 43-42 and among WASP's 26-59. Harris believes from analyzing the comments and the raw numbers that this is where Kennedy may be fatally vulnerable. A majority of the people do not believe that he has the necessary qualities of leadership to be President. (A very strong contrast can be drawn with the President).

In response to the question as to whether he has gotten where he is because of his name, 57 agree and 35 disagree.

On the question of whether he is in the same league as his brothers, 48 agree 37 disagree.

In response to the question, "Although he denies it, he is really trying to get the nomination", 44 agree 31 disagree.

Now, the shocker: "Because of what happened at Chappaquiddick, he does not deserve the Presidency". 33 agree, 51 disagree. The breakdown is:

Catholics	21-65
Blacks	12-69
WASP's	43-31
Republicans	50-34
Independents	32-51
Union Members	29-57
Democrats	26-60

This is, of course, a loaded question deliberately designed to find out the "hard core" of people who would vote against Kennedy because of Chappaquiddick. In other words, this question tells that one out of three people and most importantly one in four Democrats believe Chappaquiddick alone disqualifies him. On men and women, the break is about the same except women over 50 seemed to be much stronger on this issue.

Harris' analysis of Kennedy's candidacy obviously should be discounted because he is trying so desperately to please us. He is convinced today that Kennedy cannot be elected, that in a two-way race right now, we would beat him (those figures have not yet been collated) and that in the heat of a campaign his candidacy would generate bitter antagonisms and divide the country, which would cause him to lose ground.

Teddy's strength is in the East and upper mid-West. He is very weak in the South and West. He is strong among Catholics and union members (71% of union members are Catholics and it should be noted). So there is considerable overlap. Harris believes that the religion issue is still latently there; that it is different than 1960, but is still very much a factor.

Harris says that Muskie is dropping somewhat and his basic support is very soft. Humphrey was coming on strong, but Harris' personal opinion is that the revelation of the Kennedy-Johnson papers will kill him and that the next poll will reflect this.

One very surprising conclusion is that Kennedy is not as strong with the young as had been expected and Harris urges that we do not give up on the youth particularly if the war ends well before the next election.

Harris tells me that the gossip among his Democratic friends is that it's now a Muskie-Kennedy race, but Jackson is getting no grass roots appeal and that the McGoverns and Bayhs are out of it. He also says that McGovern is clearly a Kennedy "front" and that without any question, Kennedy's people are maneuvering him for the race. Harris feels that the liberal left will give Kennedy an edge over Muskie, particularly in view of the nature of the delegates to the convention.

At the moment, in Harris' opinion, Muskie is a more viable opponent than Kennedy, although Harris feels that if the economic issue shows any upturn at all we'll beat either one of them. He believes that if the economic upturn does not take place, we would still beat Kennedy, for the reasons that the negatives are so strong that he simply cannot command a majority.

5 As an aside, Harris believes that the economy has in fact turned up but that the public today is more negative on the economy than it has been in the last 18 months. He points out that historically, public confidence in the economy lags behind the actual recovery by 6 months. He said that this is precisely what happened in England. The economy had recovered and Wilson timed the election for the economic recovery. The public attitudes hadn't yet caught up with the facts. If the election had been 2 months later Harris believes Wilson would have been re-elected (he may be just justifying his and Gallup's failure to call it right).

One final point, Harris offers the advise that in a campaign against Teddy, we should project a moderate, calm Nixon against the flaming, hot, divisive Teddy. Teddy should be made to appear strident and immature, lacking in leadership qualities. This is where we must exploit his vulnerability, but not slash back at him. We must rise above him. Harris believes that the doubters will swing to us in large numbers near the end of the campaign, that the doubtful vote rarely goes in large numbers to a candidate who engenders the kind of strong negatives that Kennedy does. Against Muskie we would have a very different situation. His blandness makes it difficult to draw the kind of contrast we could draw with Kennedy.

I know you don't trust Harris; nor do I. I do think he is a better pollster than some of us give him credit for, however, and I am also firmly convinced that he wants desperately to weasel his way in with us and that he honestly, for whatever motive, wants to see us re-elected.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1971

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In response to the question as to whether he has gotten where he is because of his name, 57 agree and 35 disagree.

On the question of whether he is in the same league as his brothers, 48 agree 37 disagree.

In response to the question, "Although he denies it, he is really trying to get the nomination", 44 agree 31 disagree.

Now, the shocker: "Because of what happened at Chappaquiddick, he does not deserve the Presidency". 33 agree, 51 disagree. The breakdown is:

Catholics	21-65
Blacks	12-69
WASP's	43-31
Republicans	50-34
Independents	32-51
Union Members	29-57
Democrats	26-60

This is, of course, a loaded question deliberately designed to find out the "hard core" of people who would vote against Kennedy because of Chappaquiddick. In other words, this question tells that one out of three people and most importantly one in four Democrats believe Chappaquiddick alone disqualifies him. On men and women, the break is about the same except women over 50 seemed to be much stronger on this issue.

Harris' analysis of Kennedy's candidacy obviously should be discounted because he is trying so desperately to please us. He is convinced today that Kennedy cannot be elected, that in a two-way race right now, we would beat him (those figures have not yet been collated) and that in the heat of a campaign his candidacy would generate bitter antagonisms and divide the country, which would cause him to lose ground.

Teddy's strength is in the East and upper mid-West. He is very weak in the South and West. He is strong among Catholics and union members (71% of union members are Catholics and it should be noted). So there is considerable overlap. Harris believes that the religion issue is still latently there; that it is different than 1960, but is still very much a factor.

Harris says that Muskie is dropping somewhat and his basic support is very soft. Humphrey was coming on strong, but Harris' personal opinion is that the revelation of the Kennedy-Johnson papers will kill him and that the next poll will reflect this.

One very surprising conclusion is that Kennedy is not as strong with the young as had been expected and Harris urges that we do not give up on the youth particularly if the war ends well before the next election.

Harris tells me that the gossip among his Democratic friends is that it's now a Muskie-Kennedy race, but Jackson is getting no grass roots appeal and that the McGoverns and Bayh are out of it. He also says that McGovern is clearly a Kennedy "front" and that without any question, Kennedy's people are maneuvering him for the race. Harris feels that the liberal left will give Kennedy an edge over Muskie, particularly in view of the nature of the delegates to the convention.

At the moment, in Harris' opinion, Muskie is a more viable opponent than Kennedy, although Harris feels that if the economic issue shows any upturn at all we'll beat either one of them. He believes that if the economic upturn does not take place, we would still beat Kennedy, for the reasons that the negatives are so strong that he simply cannot command a majority.

As an aside, Harris believes that the economy has in fact turned up but that the public today is more negative on the economy than it has been in the last 18 months. He points out that historically, public confidence in the economy lags behind the actual recovery by 6 months. He said that this is precisely what happened in England. The economy had recovered and Wilson timed the election for the economic recovery. The public attitudes hadn't yet caught up with the facts. If the election had been 2 months later Harris believes Wilson would have been re-elected (he may be just justifying his and Gallup's failure to call it right).

One final point, Harris offers the advise that in a campaign against Teddy, we should project a moderate, calm Nixon against the flaming, hot, divisive Teddy. Teddy should be made to appear strident and immature, lacking in leadership qualities. This is where we must exploit his vulnerability, but not slash back at him. We must rise above him. Harris believes that the doubters will swing to us in large numbers near the end of the campaign, that the doubtful vote rarely goes in large numbers to a candidate who engenders the kind of strong negatives that Kennedy does. Against Muskie we would have a very different situation. His blandness makes it difficult to draw the kind of contrast we could draw with Kennedy.

I know you don't trust Harris; nor do I. I do think he is a better pollster than some of us give him credit for, however, and I am also firmly convinced that he wants desperately to weasel his way in with us and that he honestly, for whatever motive, wants to see us re-elected.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

To :

From : L. Higby



G

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD  
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102  
By CP 4-2-52

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Key States

Ken Cole asked you for a list of key states. Independent contact with Colson, Dent, Evans, and Flemming developed the recommendations attached at Tabs A, B, and C respectively. The chart at Tab D depicts 18 possible key states with notations as to who suggested which states.

Each of the individuals contacted indicated that lists are sterile and offered the following information:

1. To the five that everyone agrees on, Dent added New Hampshire, Oregon, Wisconsin, and North Carolina, primarily because of primaries and electoral votes. Dent does not believe that New York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania can be carried. Indiana is not on his list because if we can't carry it, we cannot win the election.
2. Tom Evans' suggestions are the result of his directing the RNC to do an extensive "statistical, socio-economic and survey data analysis" that developed a list of 39 states broken into four priority groups. The explanation of the selection process appears with the Evans list at Tab C. Magruder's recommendation of key states will attach the Tom Evans' list.
3. Flemming argues that any selection of key states must be separated on the basis of pre and post-Convention considerations. On the chart attached at Tab D, only the big nine states that Flemming thinks will be crucial after the Convention are listed.

Flemming's pre-Convention states include the seven that have laws which may require the President to enter the primaries as well as those states which he may have to enter for other reasons - New Hampshire, California, etc.

Of course, Flemming's concern about pre-Convention states indicates that others are thinking about the subject of your request of the Attorney General that a "formal recommendation . . . to the President covering strategy, timing, and surrogate candidates" in primary states be prepared.

Recommendation:

That Ken Cole be advised that the Colson 10 key states represents the current consensus of opinion.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

*12 A states in order I have listed  
+ 2 target possibilities - NY & Pa.*

---

*Or can take top 8 A states  
+ 2 target poss  
- which gives you Colson's list.*

---

A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN

Mr. Colson considers the following to be the key states:

- California
- Texas
- New York
- Pennsylvania
- Ohio
- Illinois
- Missouri
- Florida
- Indiana
- New Jersey

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dick", written in a cursive style.

W. Richard Howard

ⓑ

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Harry Dent called and left the following message:

THE KEY STATES:

California  
Illinois  
Ohio  
Texas  
Missouri  
New Jersey

The following are included primarily because of the primaries and electoral votes:

Florida  
- Wisconsin  
- North Carolina  
- New Hampshire  
- Oregon

The following were left off because he does not feel we can get them:

New York  
Michigan  
Pennsylvania

-----  
Indiana - Because if we cannot take it we cannot win the election.

©



Republican  
and  
Committee.

June 17, 1971


J. Evans, Jr., Co-Chairman

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO:

Gordon Strachan

FROM:

Lewis Dale 

RE: Target States

Enclosed is the material you requested. Tom asked that I emphasize to you that this material must be held in the strictest confidence. If such information finds its way into the press, the President's chances of re-election will be badly damaged.

Another point to remember is that this list is continuously updated and is subject to change, based on analyses of relevant data constantly being gathered here.

Enclosure

June 16, 1971

MUST

- 13 Indiana
- 8 Iowa
- 12 Virginia
- 17 Florida ✓
- 10 Tennessee
- 45 California ✓
- 26 Illinois ✓
- 17 New Jersey ✓
- 25 Ohio ✓
- 173

2nd PRIORITY MUST

- 26 Texas ✓
- 12 Missouri ✓
- 10 Maryland
- 13 North Carolina ✓
- 27 Pennsylvania ✓
- 41 New York ✓
- 11 Wisconsin ✓
- 8 Connecticut
- 10 Minnesota
- 158

RECEIVED  
JUN 16 1971

3rd PRIORITY MUST

- 8 South Carolina
- 9 Washington
- 4 New Mexico
- 3 Vermont
- 4 Montana
- 3 Nevada
- 7 Colorado
- 4 New Hampshire
- 6 Oregon
- 9 Kentucky
- 3 Delaware
- 4 Maine

PLUS

- 5 Nebraska
- 4 Idaho
- 6 Arizona
- 3 Wyoming
- 7 Kansas
- 4 Utah
- 3 North Dakota
- 8 Oklahoma
- 4 South Dakota
- 44

June 15, 1971

The following target states are the result of analysis of current statistical, socio-economic and survey data. The electoral vote totals of each section are noted and followed by a brief description of the reasons for their selections.

#### PLUS STATES

The Plus States are defined as those areas that traditionally support the Republican Party and Nixon. In 1972, given a favorable national atmosphere towards the President, we should do well in these states. They are also states that tend to be more single issue oriented. For example, if farmers are feeling fairly comfortable about Nixon and the agriculture policy of the Administration, the chances are that these areas will be in our column. If, on the other hand, the attitude toward Nixon and the agriculture policy is negative, there is very little that could outweigh this attitude.

#### MUST STATES

The Must States are defined as areas that statistically and historically support Nixon/Republican nominees. It appears that without all these states in our column, Nixon has little or no chance of being re-elected. Ohio and California, for instance, have never failed to be in the winning column if a Republican was victorious. The reasoning behind the statement, "If Nixon doesn't carry all of the Must States, he won't be elected President," is that if one of these states is not carried, there is little chance of finding a second or third priority state which would make up this loss more easily.

#### SECOND PRIORITY MUST STATES

The Second Priority Must States represent those states that statistically have less chance of moving over to Nixon, but, none the less, are within striking distance. These states represent the next best opportunities in the large electoral category. It is necessary that some of these be moved into the win column for Nixon.

#### THIRD PRIORITY MUST STATES

The Third Priority Must States represent those areas that statistically Nixon can win. These are areas with smaller electoral vote totals, but about the same odds, as the Second Priority Must States. Nixon must win some of these.

The method of arriving at these target states included a ten year analysis of Presidential elections, an analysis of 1966, 1968 and 1970 Congressional, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial races, an analysis of polling trends of various regions in the country and state polls where available, RNC state issue files of the past year to see if there have been any major trends or shifts in public opinion that have been evidenced in newspapers or other publications, as well as the reports of the RNC field staff.


It should be reiterated that this is the status of state priority selection as of June 15. This is not meant to be definitive, but only a device to serve the needs of those who must make early resource allocations on behalf of the effort to re-elect the President.

CONFIDENTIAL

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: Tom Evans

FROM: Ed DeBolt



States not included in previous memo:

9	Alabama
3	Alaska
6	Arkansas
3	District of Columbia
12	Georgia
4	Hawaii
10	Louisiana
14	Massachusetts
21	Michigan
7	Mississippi
4	Rhode Island
6	West Virginia
<u>99</u>	

D

K E Y    S T A T E S

A 1	15	CALIFORNIA	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
A 5	17	FLORIDA	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
A 2	26	ILLINOIS	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
A 6	17	NEW JERSEY	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
A 4	25	OHIO	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
A 3	26	TEXAS	Colson	Dent		Flemming
A 7	13	INDIANA	Colson	Dent		
A 8	12	MISSOURI	Colson	Dent		
B 1	41	NEW YORK	Colson			Flemming
B 2	21	PENNSYLVANIA	Colson			Flemming
	8	IOWA			Evans	
	4	NEW HAMPSHIRE		Dent		
A 9	13	NORTH CAROLINA		Dent		
	6	OREGON		Dent		
A 12	10	TENNESSEE			Evans	
A 10	12	VIRGINIA			Evans	
A 11	11	WISCONSIN		Dent		
X	21	MICHIGAN				Flemming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM:


ED HARPER 

SUBJECT: Issue of Interest to Swing Voters

Attached is a memo discussing the issues of interest to swing voters in the Mountain and Pacific states. We identified the issues essentially by studying public sources of information. We hope to have the same data for all 50 states ready in the next couple of days.

This memo is not an end product but rather it is designed to get us thinking about what the issues in these states really are and how our policies should respond to those issues. We would propose to regularly update this document with additional information, especially key state polls.

At this time I would appreciate your comments a. s. a. p. about three items:

1. Does this seem to be the right thing for us to be doing--it is not being duplicated by either Citizens or the RNC? 
2. Any comments or suggestions on the format--what information should we add or delete?
3. To whom should these memos be distributed--RNC, Citizens, White House?

cc: Ken Cole

ELH:ppd



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

ED HARPER ✓  
RAY WALDMANN  
PETER MICHEL

FROM:

ROY MOREY *RM*

SUBJECT:

Issues of Importance to Swing Voters  
The Mountain States and Pacific States

THE MOUNTAIN STATES

An Overview

In this eight-state region there are only 34 electoral votes. All states were carried by Nixon in 1968, and Barry Goldwater received from this region the best non-southern percentages in the nation. As a group it would make more sense to extract Albuquerque and the population centers in Arizona (Phoenix and Tucson) and place them in a separate category along with Southern California and the Central Valley in California.

With the exception of Arizona, New Mexico and to a lesser extent Colorado, which have substantial numbers of Mexican-Americans, race and ethnicity did not appear to be significant political factors in this region. Of the 6,067 elementary and secondary schools (1968 figures) only 620 are private.

Montana - Electoral vote 1972 - 4

1968 Results:

Nixon 138,835 - 50.6 percent

Humphrey 114,117 - 41.6 percent

Wallace 20,015 - 7.3 percent

Nixon plurality 24,718

For economic, geographic, and possibly political purposes, the state can be divided into eastern and western sections. The eastern section is more akin to the Dakotas and is dominated by cattle ranching and farming (especially wheat and grain). Major economic pursuit in the west is mining, especially copper mining in areas such as Butte and Anaconda. This division corresponds to congressional districts.

#### Issues and Interests

In 1968, Nixon's vote was roughly equal in both sections. However, depressed farm prices may hurt him in the eastern section. Yet copper prices are at an all-time high and presumably he will do a little better in the western section. Personal income (all personal income figures are for March 1971 reported in Business Week magazine, May 29, 1971) for the State is up 10 percent over last year against a national average of 6.4 percent. Gun control has been a significant issue in the State and was the major thrust of the unsuccessful campaign against Senator Mansfield in 1970.

Forecast: Republican in 1972

Idaho - Electoral vote 1972 - 4

1968 Results:

Nixon 165,369 - 56.8 percent

Humphrey 89,273 - 30.7 percent

Wallace 36,541 - 12.5 percent

Nixon plurality 76,096

The southern portion of the State gave Nixon his largest share of the vote in 1968 and has a strong concentration of Mormons. The northwestern part of the State is tied more closely with the eastern farm country of eastern Washington.

#### Issues and Interests

The southern part of the State contains most of the population with heavier Republican strength in the Mormon dominated southeast corner. Depressed prices in the timber and wood products industry or farm commodities (especially potatoes and sugar beets) could cause some shift in the vote in 1972. If Wallace does not run, most of his votes are likely to go Republican.

Preservation of the environment versus exploitation of natural resources was a major issue in the 1970 campaign.

Personal income for the State is up 7 percent over last year.

Forecast: Republican in 1972

Wyoming - Electoral vote 1972 - 3

1968 Results:

Nixon 70,927 - 55.8 percent

Humphrey 45,173 - 35.5 percent

Wallace 11,105 - 8.7 percent

Nixon plurality 25,754

This is basically a conservative State with hostility toward "radical liberalism." Republicanism is strong in the State despite Gale McGhee's re-election in 1970 who is basically a Nixon supporter on the war.

Issues and Interests

There has been no major influx of new voters into the State since 1968. In fact, there has been a slight decline in population between 1960 and 1970. Sheep and cattle ranching plus agriculture (sugar beets, grain, and potatoes) are important in Wyoming. There is increased growth in mining (especially uranium), plus major oil refineries in the Casper area.

Personal income is up 7.2 percent over last year.

Forecast: Unless there is a major economic dislocation, or change of posture on the part of the GOP on the question of "radical liberalism," Republicans will be strong in 1972.

Utah - Electoral vote 1972 - 4  
1968 Results:  
Nixon 238,728 - 56.5 percent  
Humphrey 156,665 - 37.1 percent  
Wallace 26,906 - 6.4 percent  
Nixon plurality 82,063

This is a State with a rather homogenous white, middleclass population including the metropolitan area of Salt Lake. Utah continues as a basically conservative and economically prosperous State which is dominated by the Morman Church.

Issues and Interests

This is a strong "right to work" state despite significant growth in steel mills, smelters, canneries, and sugar refineries. Tourism and reclamation projects are important. High copper prices have no doubt helped the economy. Wallace polled 6.4 percent of the vote in 1968 and would be lucky to do as well again. Personal income in Utah is up a substantial 10.4 percent over last year.

Forecast: Republican for 1972

Colorado - Electoral vote 1972 - 7  
1968 Results:  
Nixon 409,345 - 50.5 percent  
Humphrey 335,174 - 41.4 percent  
Wallace 60,813 - 7.5 percent  
Nixon plurality 74,171

This was a strong State for Nixon in 1968. Peter Dominick had an easy election in 1968, Gordon Allott should have no trouble in 1972. It is an economically prosperous and decidedly conservative State. Greatest Democratic strength is found in the Denver metropolitan area, however, two Republicans were elected for Congress from this area in 1970. Denver County constitutes less than 25 percent of the State's population which is sufficient to swing a statewide election.

Issues and Interests

This is a rural agricultural and mining (especially lead, zinc, and uranium in the Four Corners area) State with important pockets of well developed industry. It is basically white-collar industry in Denver and heavy industry in the Pueblo area (steel). Issues include forced bussing in the Denver area, campus unrest, and problems of pollution. Federal contracts are especially important in the Denver and Colorado Springs areas. Colorado has 12 percent of the nation's 7.5 million Mexican-Americans. They are located primarily in Denver and the Southern tier of counties. This bloc probably does not constitute a swing-vote in favor of the Democrats. Personal income is up 9.2 percent over last for the State.

Forecast: Moderately strong Republican for 1972.

New Mexico - Electoral vote 1972 - 4

1968 Results:

Nixon 169,692 - 51.8 percent

Humphrey 130,081 - 39.7 percent

Wallace 25,737 - 7.9 percent

Nixon plurality 39,611

This is traditionally a Democratic State with substantial GOP gains since the war, especially in the metropolitan area of Albuquerque. New Mexico has a substantial Mexican-American population, 27 percent of the national total. A minority within this group is the traditionally established (Hispanios) who attempt to maintain a separate identity. There are strong conservative trends in the southern section, "Little Texas" (protestant "dry" eastern portion) and parts of the Albuquerque, metropolitan area. The State leans toward the GOP, but the Republican party has had its share of internal problems.

Issues and Interests

Strength in the economy is mixed. There is extreme poverty among Mexican-Americans in the northern portion and there have been layoffs in Defense, Research, and Missile industries which is a great importance to the State. Setbacks in this area could make a substantial difference in 1972. There is some militancy among Mexican-Americans with the potential of anglo backlash. Mexican-Americans probably do not constitute a swing factor but coupled with a depression in agriculture and white-collar industry, it could spell trouble for the GOP in 1972. Personal income is up only 5.8 percent over last year which is below the national average of 6.4 percent.

Forecast: Leaning Republican for 1972, but in doubt.

Nevada - Electoral vote 1972 - 3

1968 Results:

Nixon 73,188 - 47.5 percent

Humphrey 60,598 - 39.3 percent

Wallace 20,432 - 13.2 percent

Nixon plurality 12,590

Nevada had the highest population increase of any state in the nation between 1960 and 1970 at 68.9 percent. Clark County (Las Vegas) had a population of increase of 112.6 percent which was the highest percentage increase within the State. This is basically a conservative State with Republicanism being bolstered by substantial increases in population especially in the Las Vegas area. The State is represented in Congress by moderate to conservative Democrats. In 1968, Wallace definitely cut in to Nixon votes in the State and received 13 percent. A Wallace candidacy in 1972 could be a significant factor in this State.

Issues and Interests

Tourism, ranching and defense spending are significant in Nevada. Issues in the 1970 campaign concentrated on "radical liberalism" and law and order, however, these issues were not used successfully against Howard Cannon in his Senate race. Personal income is up only 4.8 percent over last year.

Forecast: Leaning Republican but doubtful.

Arizona - Electoral vote 1972 - 6

1968 Results:

Nixon 266,721 - 54.8 percent

Humphrey 170,514 - 35.0 percent

Wallace 46,573 - 9.6 percent

Nixon plurality 96,207

The key to Arizona politics is Maricopa County (Phoenix) which has more than 55 percent of the State's population. Pima County (Tucson) has over 19 percent. Phoenix is heavily conservative and Republican and saved the political lives of Paul Fannin and Governor Jack Williams in their re-election campaigns of 1970.

Issues and Interests

Approximately 10 percent of the State's population is over 65 years of age and is concentrated in Phoenix and Tucson. The State depends upon tourism, Federal contracts, and white-collar industry (especially in Phoenix and to a lesser extent in Tucson). Mining and cattle ranching are still important along with the generation of electricity. Issues include campus unrest, property and land taxes, and to a smaller extent air pollution. There is a sizable Mexican-American population (20 percent of the national total) in the southern part of the State and a sizable number of Indians in the North. Both groups are Democratic but are probably not sufficient to offset Phoenix Republican strength.

The unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Governor in 1970 was a popular Mexican-American from the Tuscon area but was defeated primarily by the vote out of Phoenix. Personal income is up a substantial 11.2 percent over last year for the State.

Forecast: Strongly Republican

### THE PACIFIC STATES

Obviously, the key to this area is California and more especially, Southern California. President Nixon failed to carry Washington and Hawaii in 1968, and there is not much reason to think that his chances are going to be any better in these States for 1972.

The economic, racial, and political issue picture in this area is much more volatile than in the Mountain States. There is a substantial Catholic population in the State of California. Of the 10,128 (1968 figures), elementary and secondary schools in the region, 2,195 are private schools and 1,532 of these are located in California.

California - Electoral vote 1972 - 45  
1968 Results:  
Nixon 3,467,664 - 47.8 percent  
Humphrey 3,244,318 - 44.7 percent  
Wallace 487,270 - 6.7 percent  
Nixon plurality 223,346

The estimated population for California for 1970 is approximately 20 million persons with 60 percent of them living in the ten southern counties, including Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego. California has almost 2 million residents over the age of 65 with most of them living in the south. Approximately six percent of the population is black (1960 figures) and other minority groups constitute three percent of the State's population including substantial numbers of Japanese, Chinese, and Philipinos.



Republicans, including Nixon in 1968, received their greatest support in Southern California (L. A. suburbs, Orange, and San Diego Counties) while the Democratic stronghold is San Francisco Bay area. However, it has less than 20 percent of the votes.

California has 16 percent of the nation's Mexican-American population with the heaviest concentration (approximately one million) living in Los Angeles. The Central Valley is dominated by large, highly mechanized agriculture (agribusiness), and it also provides strong Republican support.

Wallace received his greatest support (6.7 percent of the 1968 vote) in the south and Central Valley. This vote was conservative, southern oriented and would normally go Republican.

#### Issues and Interests

Federal spending has more impact on California than any other State of the Union. The economic base includes general commerce, light industry, military preparedness, defense production, and space-age technology especially in the south. Issues include patriotism, racial turmoil including bussing and open housing.

Property taxes, especially for schools, the burden of welfare, air pollution, highway construction, and slack in housing and the building trades.

Personal income is up only 5.8 percent over last year and below the 6.4 percent national average.

In a close contest, the blacks and Mexican-Americans could make a differences, especially if unemployment continues in aerospace and defense and if building starts are down. Otherwise, issues will include inflation, property tax, unrest, welfare, and patriotism.

Forecast: At present, there is no clear favorite for 1972. Even slight improvement in the south and Central Valley would tip the balance in favor of Republicans.

Oregon - Electoral vote 1972 - 6  
1968 Results:  
Nixon 408,433 - 49.9 percent  
Humphrey 358,866 - 43.8 percent  
Wallace 49,683 - 6.1 percent  
Nixon plurality 49,567

This could be a difficult State to call in 1972. Democratic strength will be found in Multnomah County (Portland) which has approximately 26 percent of the State's population. Republican strength will come from Portland's suburbs and middle-class areas in the Willamette Valley, plus strength in the rural areas. However, the eastern rural area of the State has only 15 percent of the population. Oregon has a homogeneous white middle-class population with only approximately one percent black population.

Issues and Interests

Issues in Oregon will include taxes--in 1969 a sales tax endorsed by Governor McCall was overwhelmingly defeated, protection of the environment, domestic tranquility, and bussing in the metropolitan areas. Personal income for Oregon is up 8.1 percent over last year.

Forecast: Leaning Republican but in doubt. This could be clouded by the Hatfield re-election race.

Washington - Electoral vote 1972 - 9  
1968 Results:  
Nixon 588,510 - 45.1 percent  
Humphrey 616,037 - 47.2 percent  
Wallace 96,990 - 7.4 percent  
Humphrey plurality 27,527

Washington went for Humphrey in 1968 and there is no reason to think it will go Republican in 1972. The GOP fared poorly in 1970 and unemployment in the Seattle area is well over 10 percent. Personal income for the State is up only 1.2 percent over last year which is the lowest increase in the entire nation.

Forecast: Strongly Democratic for 1972.

Hawaii - Electoral vote 1972 - 4

1968 Results:

Nixon 91,425 - 38.7 percent

Humphrey 141,324 - 59.8 percent

Wallace 3,469 - 1.5 percent

Humphrey plurality 49,899

Issues and Interests

Issues in the State of Hawaii include environmental decay, inadequate and overcrowded housing, inflation, and an increasing problem of crime and delinquency particularly in the Honolulu area. Personal income in Hawaii is up 8.3 percent.

Forecast: Hawaii went Democratic in 1968 and with the exception of Hiram Fong's re-election, it went Democratic in 1970. There is little reason to think that it will not go Democratic in 1972.

Alaska - Electoral vote 1972 - 3

1968 Results:

Nixon 37,600 - 45.3 percent

Humphrey 35,411 - 42.6 percent

Wallace 10,024 - 12.1 percent

Nixon plurality 2,189

Issues and Interests

Issues in the State of Alaska include the oil pipeline controversy, native claims, transportation, economic development, native education, and native health.

Forecasts: Alaska leans Republican and may be helped by a vigorous campaign for re-election by Ted Stevens plus a settlement of the oil pipeline controversy.

RM:jw 6/11/71

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Magruder Meeting with  
the Attorney General -  
June 23

Today Magruder discussed the following subjects with the Attorney General:

1. RNC Budget Problems:

Pursuant to the Attorney General's request, Magruder examined the RNC cash flow, payroll, and organization chart. Magruder's report, which the Attorney General reviewed quickly, is attached. To summarize:

a) The RNC will have a deficit of \$2,000,000 by December, 1971; this results from \$1,000,000 less income and \$1,000,000 more in expenses;

b) The RNC asserts that \$900,000 is solely for the support for the re-election of the President. This is an overstatement;

c) The RNC is asking Citizens for \$1,000,000. The other \$1,000,000 of the deficit will be raised by the RNC. Magruder offers several options assuming the decision is made to assume \$1,000,000 of the RNC deficit. The options include: Have Kalmbach, Nunn and Sloan re-direct their efforts to acquire \$1,000,000; Citizens assume financial responsibility for some of the functions that may be related to the re-election of the President; fund the RNC with Citizens funds on hand; or cut back RNC programs to fit the budget.

The options involving the fundraisers or funds on hand will result in formidable difficulties, including the possibility of resignation by Lee Nunn and Hugh Sloan.

2. Ken Rietz

Senator Brock urged the Attorney General to hire Ken Rietz to be Executive Director of Young Voters for Nixon. Rietz

will cover all relationships with Treleaven, Allison and Rietz and begin working at Citizens on July 1st at a total salary of \$35,000. Brock argued that Rietz should receive \$40,000, and the Attorney General finally approved \$28,000 from the Citizens budget and \$8,000 from a discretionary account (see below #3).

3. The Attorney General has authorized a "limited discretionary account" for McGruder. Only Hank Buchanan, who is not yet doing the accounting work, will know of the account at Citizens.

The amount of the account as well as Rietz's salary might be an appropriate subject to raise in the general finance review session to be held next week with the Attorney General and Herb Kahlbach.

4. The Attorney General reacted very favorably to the polling plan prepared by Higby and McGruder. The Attorney General believes the polling structure suggested will be an excellent solution to the current confusion. He would like to meet with you and Flanigan next week to review the system.

5. Apparently, a personality clash is developing between Lee Lunn and Tom Evans. This has been aggravated by the recent interest in SAC financial problems. The Attorney General is concerned but has not decided upon a solution.

GS:lm

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

SUITE 272  
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004  
(202) 333-0320

June 22, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE BUDGET

As you requested, I have obtained information from the Republican National Committee on their budget problems.

At Tab A is a functional organizational chart and description of their activities for the RNC. They have asked not to do a regular organizational chart because many of their duties overlap. They have 156 full time employees with a total payroll of \$1,992,000. At Tab B is the payroll by job classification. At Tab C is the report that they have already given you relating to their budget problems.

Some clarification should be made of statements contained in their presentation. They indicate that over \$900,000 is solely for support for the re-election of the President. I think this is an overstatement. Actually, much of that activity is part of the RNC's charter and would continue as an activity for any incumbent President. It is true that most of this activity could be beneficial to the re-election of the President, but to say that it is solely for this purpose is simply not correct.

They have indicated a repayment on their debt totalling approximately \$1,200,000. This debt was incurred in the 1968 and 1970 campaigns. It is my understanding that at the end of the campaigns there were sufficient funds to pay these debts but the funds were used for operating purposes at the RNC rather than for the debt repayment.

Based on their cash flow, they will have an estimated \$2,400,000 deficit by December, and an actual budget deficit of approximately \$2,000,000 by that time. As their analysis shows, they will be \$1,000,000 under their proposed budget in income and \$1,000,000 over in expenditures.

CONFIDENTIAL

They are asking the Citizens Committee to contribute approximately \$1,000,000 and they feel they can raise the other \$1,000,000 so they can balance their budget.


The problem the RNC faces is that after the 1968 campaign they expanded the services and the staff and have continued on this expanded pattern since that time. Unfortunately, even if we felt it was important to cut spending at the RNC through payroll reductions and other means, I doubt if we could come up with substantial savings as they have already made a strenuous effort to reduce their operating expenses and have cutback on various projects i.e., heritage group activities, publication of the Republican Magazine, and other activities of this kind. If they do not receive increased income they will be forced to cut in areas that could adversely affect the re-election of the President and would force us to spend probably greater sums to develop these same activities. This is particularly true in their voter analysis area.

If we are to assume \$1,000,000 of their deficit, there are several possible ways to accomplish this goal.

1. Have our fund raising people raise the \$1,000,000 for the RNC and have the money paid directly to the RNC. John Dean feels this would be the safest legally.
2. Assume payment of certain bills (particularly those related to re-election efforts) from the RNC which, in effect, would then reduce their budget and increase our requirements.
3. Fund the National Committee directly from our funds. This would be very difficult to do legally and could create considerable public relations problems because the President is not yet the nominee of the Party.
4. Simply determine which programs actually do benefit the re-election of the President and take over the responsibility for them here at the Committee.

The question that this situation basically raises is the precedent it will set from now until election day. By assuming responsibility for part of their fund raising activities for this year it will then be logical for us to assume responsibility for part of their fund raising next year.

JAMES S. GRUDER



FUNCTIONAL CHART RNC

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

B. Dole            Chairman  
A. Armstrong    Co-Chairman  
T. Evans          Co-Chairman

FINANCE COMMITTEE -----

J. Milbank, Chairman  
P. Wilson, Co-Chairman  
B. Odell, Director

ADMINISTRATION & ORGANIZATION -----

T. EVANS, CO-CHAIRMAN

COMMUNICATIONS

L. Nofziger, Deputy Chairman

RESEARCH & POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

E. DeBolt, Deputy Chairman

ADMINISTRATION

B. Mountain, Deputy Chairman

CONVENTION

J. Good, Director

R.G.A.

J. Galbraith, Director


WOMEN'S ACTIVITIES &

SPECIAL PROGRAMS


A. ARMSTRONG, CO-CHAIRMAN

N.F.R.W., Y.R., C.R.





\* STAFF SUPPORT



\*STAFF SUPPORT:

5

16

3

4

3

## ADMINISTRATION

The Administration section exists primarily to support other divisions and is charged with the responsibility of providing coordination, control, and operational efficiency within the Committee. It also supervises all sundry tasks not logically a part of other divisions.

The division consists of the following functional areas:

1. Comptrollers Office - This office handles all the financial records at the Committee and receives and processes all the Committees contributions and vendors invoices. This office is presently developing a new accounting system for the 1972 campaign.

2. Print Shop and Mail Room - This operation is a multi-purpose printing facility with a variety of capabilities. This area also processes all intra-Committee, incoming and outgoing mail.

\*3. Appointments and Commissions - This office has established an effective system of locating and rewarding deserving party members as well as Independents and Democrats loyal to the President.

4. The Executive Correspondence section is a sophisticated approach to handling larger volumes of mail. As conceived it will be capable of efficiently handling approximately 2,500 letters per week.

5. General Administration - This area carries on the various day to day housekeeping functions at the Committee. The following areas are included: reception, volunteers, building maintenance, telephone operations and personnel.

\* For budget and organizational purposes, Appointments and Commissions Department is a function of Administration. For practical reasons, the director reports to Co-Chairman Evans.



## COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

The Communications Division is charged with the responsibility of dispensing information and its services have been divided into six categories: direct mailing, publications, advisory board, press relations, speech writing and radio and television actualities.

### DIRECT MAILING

1. Builds and maintains the mailing lists of the Communications Division of the White House and the mailing lists of the Republican National Committee.
2. Carries through and makes sure mailings prescribed by the White House and the Republican National Committee are completed.

### PUBLICATIONS

1. MONDAY--a weekly publication sent to 45,000 people whose purpose is to keep the press informed of our positions relative to potential Democratic Presidential hopefuls as well as to inform party leaders and activists on up-to-date information regarding Presidential-oriented issues.
2. 1st MONDAY--to be sent monthly to those who contribute <sup>75</sup> \$75 or more, this publication is geared to Presidential issues. Publication begins in July.
3. IMPACT MATERIAL--designed to educate the voter on specific issues within the President's province.
4. YOUTH-ORIENTED MATERIALS--designed to inform youth of the President's concern and efforts in the areas of interest to them.
5. ARCHIVES--designed to inventory and store campaign materials.

### ADVISORY BOARD

The duties of the Advisory Board include the following:


1. To develop new programs to bring members of American ethnic and minority groups and senior citizens into the Republican party.
2. To advise Chairman Dole on the interests and problems of American ethnics, senior citizens, blacks, agriculture and labor.
3. To provide recognition for these special groups in the form of patronage recommendations.
4. To provide a listening post through which the White House and the RNC can obtain information on these special groups.

### PRESS RELATIONS

### SPEECH WRITING

### RADIO AND TELEVISION ACTUALITIES

The preparation of radio and television actualities is designed to circumvent the networks and deliver directly to local television and radio stations pro-Administration news on pertinent issues.



## POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The objective of the Political Division of the Republican National Committee is to improve the relative status of the Republican Party in national politics so as to insure the reelection of the President and the election of more Republicans at all levels. The RNC's political programs examine, develop and utilize the latest political techniques on which political decision-makers can base their actions.

Field Operations - The field staff currently operates to bring our Party organizations the expertise and talent available from all RNC functions including but not limited to the 10-year MISSION 70's party development program, fundraising assistance, management and administrative techniques and liaison with Federal Government operations.

BALLOT SECURITY - Activities are underway to expand this program developed in the 1968 election. It will include providing the states with model elections laws, identifying probable vote fraud areas, developing and improving techniques to combat vote fraud and working closely with party leaders to develop effective programs.

REDISTRICTING AND ELECTION DATA ACQUISITION - The RNC thoroughly researched and then published a unique compilation of information concerning the legal aspects of congressional and legislative redistricting by state legislatures, which is now being used extensively as a result of the reapportionment required by the 1970 census. As the various states carry out reapportionment the RNC is providing, in addition to this legal advice, technical assistance and liaison with the Census Bureau. As a result of the above work, the RNC has acquired election and Census files which will be an integral part of the '72 presidential election statistical analysis.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING - The Political Division is managing eight campaign management seminars to be held across the United States in the summer and fall of 1971. The seminars are designed to educate and motivate present and potential Party leaders and workers with a view toward the '72 elections. In 1971 there will be 4 regional Republican conferences in which the RNC will assist in conducting. Also the RNC will conduct a professional staff conference to bring the latest professional political techniques to the various staff members of the state organizations.

VOTER IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM (VIP) - A majority of the above-mentioned activities are directly related to the VIP Program, which is the comprehensive plan being developed to utilize vote history data, socio-economic data and past and current public opinion survey data to identify key areas in which target campaign resources for the '72 presidential election. When developed, this program will provide Republican political decision-makers with one of the most advanced and comprehensive tools ever developed for resource allocation for the campaign.

## RESEARCH

The issue development area has been involved in the production of a series of reports on Administration accomplishments, programs and initiatives. Reports have been issued on the economy, revenue sharing, health, government reorganization, welfare reform, the cancer cure program, etc. In addition, a series of background reports for speech use were prepared on foreign affairs, the first two on Vietnam and the Middle East.

The unit maintains current files on all public opinion polls issued by public polling concerns. A weekly "poll report" is issued on all politically relevant polls of the preceding week and a special monthly report is issued to state party organizations.

The unit maintains working files on election data, election laws and demographic material.

The backbone of the issue research unit is the microfilm retrieval system. The unit received 100 daily newspapers and periodicals and prepares them for input into the retrieval system. This section distributes news clips of politically relevant information to RNC and White House personnel daily.

The retrieval system contains about 150,000 documents on the Nixon Administration along with major files on public opinion, black newspapers and the National Democratic party.

The Research library is a good current political reference source with microfilm files back to 1960.

The opposition section of the division gathers and synthesizes factual information on national Democratic figures. The staff



has the capacity to document the positions and statements of leading Democrats on all major issues. The microfilm system contains almost 100,000 documents on Democrats.

The Data Processing section of the Political/Research Division assists in the maintenance of Committee operations currently using the computer and provides technical guidance for the development of new uses of the computer. Principally, it is involved in the gathering, assimilation and analysis of a wide variety of political information in computer form. This includes computer tape files containing ten years of election results, 1970 Census population and housing information and a large number of names of individuals and organizations throughout the nation. Plans are being made to gather, record and relate a considerable amount of survey data to the election, Census and individual information already on computer tapes.

<u>POSITIONS</u>	<u>YEARLY MINIMUM</u>	<u>YEARLY MAXIMUM</u>
Co-Chairman and Deputy Chairman	\$ 30,000	\$ 40,000
Division Director & Special Assistant	18,000	28,000
Assistant Director & Exec. Assistant	14,000	25,000
Admin. Assistant	10,000	18,000
Executive Secretary & Supervisor	9,000	15,000
Secretary Level II and III	7,000	9,000
Machine Operator & Technical Clerk	5,000	8,500
Secretary Level I & Clerk	4,000	7,000



Republican  
National  
Committee.


CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO:

TOM EVANS

FROM:

BARRY MOUNTAIN 

As a result of our meeting on Monday, several questions were raised concerning operations here at the National Committee and additional information was requested concerning our current and projected financial situation.

In accordance with these requests I have attached the following information:

- 1) An explanation of the increase in Administrative costs and of the decrease in operating costs;
- 2) A cash projection analysis listing monthly expenditures and projected revenue for the months of June through December, 1971; and,
- 3) A current monthly expenditure analysis.

I have also attached information sheets showing the functional structure of the RNC, the RNC operating costs for 1971, the total RNC budget responsibilities for 1971 and the projected expenditures of the RNC aimed solely at re-electing the President.

In summation, I would like to emphasize several items discussed on Monday.

First, the RNC is operating on a pre-campaign schedule. We have initiated and assumed responsibility for several major programs directly affecting the re-election efforts of the President. These programs are individually listed on the attached chart and total approximately \$980,000.

Secondly, steps have been taken to cut expenditures within the RNC operating budget. The total number of employees has decreased since January 15 when the present RNC Administration took office. A freeze has been levied against all salary increases for employees making over \$10,000 and only a few minimal increases have been granted to employees under this level. Operating overhead has been

June 10, 1971

reduced to the bare minimum. A system of priorities has been established and programs not considered priority have been indefinitely deferred. The White House has also given us full cooperation by setting priorities and guidelines in order to control spending.

However, even with these savings which have and will continue to be realized, the RNC is in serious financial difficulty. The need to repay the 1968 and 1970 campaign debts, totaling \$1,200,000, will absorb revenue which otherwise could have been directed to RNC programs and operating costs. Furthermore, revenues for 1971 are falling short of the projected level and at the current rate will not meet the \$5.9 million level mark set in December, 1970.

I would like to add that we have had full cooperation from Bob Odell and the Finance Committee in preparing these reports and although they admittedly say that their revenue projections are conservative, the figures listed present an objective picture of our current situation.

In conclusion it is essential that we receive early financial relief in order that we may continue our present program which is budgeted and operational at \$998,000 over the original mid-December figure of \$3,011,000. The additional pre-campaign figure of \$998,000 relates to programs developed and already implemented by the three Deputy Chairmen with your approval and endorsement as well as that of Chairman Dole and Co-Chairman Armstrong. Finance Chairman Milbank and his staff have been made fully aware of all developments since the inception of the budget review in late February, 1971.

cc: Chairman Dole  
Co-Chairman Armstrong  
Chairman Milbank

kg/BM

ADMINISTRATION DIVISION BUDGET INCREASE OF \$183,000

A) Three new departments have been included in the Administration Budget for 1971. These are 1) the Patronage Department which has been established to expedite a system of merit and reward for loyal Republicans and for Independents and Democrats loyal to the President. This office works closely with the White House in locating deserving individuals and presently consists of a Director and three staff members; 2) the Secretarial Pool which will consist of 4 secretaries with superior skills whose purpose will be to backstop the secretarial needs and demands for the Executive, Political and Advisory Board departments. This staff will reduce the number of personal secretaries assigned to each of the above areas; and 3) a Correspondence Section which will not only facilitate present correspondence demands of 600 plus letters a week, but also provide the capacity for handling greater demands during the campaign. \$ 80,000

B) Salaries and the payroll burden have been increased due to the reclassification of accounts rather than from additional personnel. In previous years, the Division's director and his immediate staff were charged against the Executive Division. This year, however, they were classified under their proper heading.

There are, in fact, two less employees in the Division than there were in January, 1971 and the entire Division covers seven areas - General Administration (reception, maintenance, and the Deputy Chairman's office); the Comptroller's office, Mail and Printing, Telephone Operations, Purchasing and Supply, Patronage and the Secretarial Pool. \$ 50,000

C) The Professional Services budget was increased to provide professional assistance in modifying our accounting system in preparation for the 1972 campaign. This budget category was also increased to meet the additional security requirements created by the location of our new building. \$ 35,000

D) The remaining increase was caused by increases in a number of sundry areas such as telephones, office supplies, xerox equipment, printing, etc. It should be noted that a large portion of this should be charged to other divisions, but for practical accounting purposes is absorbed by Administration. \$ 18,000

OPERATING COST DECREASE OF \$234,000

- A) In 1970 the cost for modifying and redesigning plans for the Eisenhower Center, along with decorating and furnishing costs, was substantial. However, although much of the work is still uncompleted and was originally scheduled for 1971, we have limited such improvements to essential minimums and still satisfied immediate needs.
- B) The RNC airplane was sold realizing a major cost savings.
- C) Reductions have been made in travel and entertainment expense.
- D) A thorough study was made of printing and duplicating costs which resulted in a new system of metering. These changes will save the RNC over \$2,500 per month.

Total estimated savings \$234,000

REPUBLICAN PARTY HEADQUARTERS

CASH PROJECTION

	<u>Beginning Cash Balance</u>	<u>Estimated Revenue</u>	<u>Projected Expenditures</u>	<u>Projected Cash Balance</u>
JUNE	\$ 502,227	\$ 300,000	\$ 272,922*	\$ 529,305
JULY	529,305	110,000	290,522*	348,783
AUGUST	348,783	140,000	272,922*	215,861
SEPTEMBER	215,861	780,000	964,511* 212,500**	[181,150]
OCTOBER	[181,150]	75,000	680,236* 212,500**	[998,886]
NOVEMBER	[998,886]	25,000	631,836* 212,500**	[1,818,222]
DECEMBER	[1,818,222]	25,000	477,829* 212,500**	[2,483,551]
TOTAL		<u>\$ 1,455,000</u>	<u>\$ 4,440,778</u>	<u>\$ [2,483,551] +</u>
Total Excluding Debt Payments***		<u>1,455,000</u>	<u>\$ 3,590,778</u>	<u>\$ [1,633,551]</u>

- \* RNC, RNFC & Auxiliary Operations
- \*\* Projected payments on campaign deficit
- \*\*\* Campaign deficit is presently \$850,000

NOTE: Because of the present shortage of cash, we are deferring all bills not requiring immediate payment. The expenditure increases for September, October and November, therefore, reflect our intention to liquidate the accumulation of these deferred obligations.

+ Variance will not exceed plus or minus 7% of \$ 2,483,551

ESTIMATED REVENUE

	<u>JANUARY 1 - MAY 31</u>	<u>JUNE 1 - DECEMBER 31</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
RN ASSOCIATES, ETC.	\$ 737,086	\$ 385,000	\$ 1,122,086
SUSTAINING	2,206,794	1,070,000	3,276,794
MARCH DINNER	420,321	-0-	420,321
TOTAL	<u>\$ 3,364,201</u>	<u>\$ 1,455,000</u>	<u>\$ 4,819,201*</u>

\* Actual revenue budgeted for 1971 is \$5,807,345



REPUBLICAN PARTY HEADQUARTERS

Uncommitted Cash Balance

May 28, 1970 - 1971

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>Increase/ (Decrease)</u>
<u>REVENUE</u>			
Uncommitted Cash January 1	\$ 648,529	\$ (354,781)	\$ (1,003,310)
Contributions	3,814,873	3,364,201	(450,672)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Cash Available	\$4,463,402	\$3,009,420	\$ (1,453,982)
<u>EXPENDITURES</u>			
Expenditures 1/1 - 5/28	\$ 3,106,536	\$ 2,848,406*	\$ (258,130)
Uncommitted Cash Available May 28	<u>\$ 1,356,866</u>	<u>\$ 161,014</u>	<u>\$ (1,195,852)</u>

SOURCES OF CONTRIBUTIONS JANUARY 1 - MAY 28\*\*

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>Increase/ (Decrease)</u>
RN Associates	\$ 1,202,712	\$ 585,313	\$ (617,399)
Sustaining	1,787,515	2,206,794	419,279
Campaign Programs	95,686	89,876	(5,810)
March Dinner	562,004	420,321	(141,683)
Speakers Commissions	157,412	32,151	(125,261)
State Payments	3,486	-0-	(3,486)
Special Projects/Miscellaneous	6,058	29,746	23,688
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS	<u>\$ 3,814,873</u>	<u>\$ 3,364,201</u>	<u>\$ (450,672)</u>

\* includes debt repayment of \$350,000

\*\* Source from May 28 receipts & expenditure sheet

ANALYSIS OF PROJECTED CASH DEFICIT

December 31, 1971

	<u>Amount</u>
<u>Reductions in Revenue</u>	
Revenue budgeted for 1971	\$5,807,345
Revised Revenue Estimate for 1971	<u>4,819,201</u>
Total Reduction in Revenue	\$988,144
<u>Budget Increase</u>	
<u>Revised Budget</u>	
RNC	\$4,009,522
White House	500,000
Campaign Debt	1,200,000
RNFC	<u>1,159,315</u>
	6,868,837
Original Budget	<u>5,870,345</u>
Total Budget Increase	998,492
<u>Cash Deficit January 1, 1971</u>	
Negative Balance Uncommitted Cash January 1, 1971	354,781
<u>Unbudgeted Items</u>	
Citizens' Committee	52,000
Film - President's Accomplishments	<u>100,000</u>
	152,000
Projection Difference	<u>( 9,866)</u>
	\$2,483,551

REPUBLICAN PARTY NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Current Months Operation

June 1971

Salaries	\$166,000
Rent	18,237
Telephone	14,000
Postage	43,000
White House Support	8,500
Airlines	4,000
Retirement	715
Employee Benefits	5,700
Professional Fees	7,770
Miscellaneous	<u>5,000</u>
	272,922
<u>Deferrable Costs</u>	
RNC Other Costs	123,182
RNC Support * No Debt Retirement	31,200
RNFC Program Costs	<u>68,800</u>
	496,104
Debt Retirement	<u>120,400</u>
	<u>616,504</u>

	<u>Monthly Costs Not Including Debt Retirement</u>	<u>Monthly Costs Including Debt Retirement</u>
June	\$496,104	\$616,504
July	519,929*	640,329*
August	528,929	649,329
September	741,329*	861,729*
October	450,829	571,229
November	375,829	496,229
December	<u>477,829</u>	<u>607,429</u>
Total	\$3,590,778	\$4,440,778

\* Includes Payments Due on File

	<u>Without Debt Retirement</u>	<u>With Debt Retirement</u>
Average Expenditures Per Month	\$512,968	\$634,397

TOTAL RNC BUDGET RESPONSIBILITIES

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>% of total</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>% of total</u>
RNC Operations	\$ 3,565,408	48.0%	\$ 3,687,825	53.6%
Debt Reduction	387,965	5.2%	1,200,000	17.5%
RNFC	1,827,732	24.6%	1,159,315	16.9%
Auxiliary Support	395,773	5.4%	321,697	4.7%
Direct White House Support	1,242,065	16.8%	500,000	7.3%
TOTAL	<u>\$ 7,418,948</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>\$ 6,868,837</u>	<u>100%</u>

PROJECTS AIMED SOLELY AT  
RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

	<u>BUDGET</u>
FIELD OPERATIONS	\$ 143,404
ACQUISITION OF BASE FILES	275,000
FILM - PRESIDENT'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS	100,000
POLLS & SURVEYS	140,000
R & D OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE	40,000
CITIZENS' COMMITTEE	52,000
EXPANSION OF ISSUE RESEARCH CAPACITY	35,000
OPPOSITION RESEARCH - FIELD FORCE	30,000
TV & RADIO	93,000
OFFENSIVE SCHEDULING	<u>75,000</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$ 983,404</u>

RNC OPERATIONS

	1970		1971	
	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
EXECUTIVE	\$ 661,131	18%	\$ 587,485	16%
POLITICAL	841,867	23%	792,669	21%
COMMUNICATIONS	598,855	17%	683,125	19%
RESEARCH	303,660	9%	520,871	14%
ADMINISTRATION	452,974	13%	<sup>a</sup> 636,141	17%
OPERATING COSTS	701,911	20%	467,534	13%
TOTAL	<u>\$ 3,560,400</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>\$ 3,687,825</u>	<u>100%</u>

FUNCTIONAL CHART RNC

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

B. Dole            Chairman  
A. Armstrong    Co-Chairman  
T. Evans          Co-Chairman

FINANCE COMMITTEE

J. Milbank, Chairman  
P. Wilson, Co-Chairman  
B. Odell, Director

ADMINISTRATION & ORGANIZATION

T. EVANS, CO-CHAIRMAN

COMMUNICATIONS

L. Nofziger, Deputy Chairman

RESEARCH & POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

E. DeBolt, Deputy Chairman

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B. Mountain, Deputy Chairman

CONVENTION

J. Good, Director

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J. Galbraith, Director

WOMEN'S ACTIVITIES &

SPECIAL PROGRAMS

A. ARMSTRONG, CO-CHAIRMAN

N.F.R.W., Y.R., C.R.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G  
SUBJECT: RNC Delaware Study

Tom Evans has directed Ed DeBolt to spend \$35-40,000 studying the effect of selective media and campaign devices on voters. Canvass polling of test and control precincts will attempt to assess the impact of targeted approaches to voters by direct mail, telephone, and door-to-door personal persuasion. The test is described in some detail in the Draft Memorandum attached at Tab A. Magruder will advise the Attorney General of this project sometime next week.

Rose Woods sent you a memorandum on June 9 suggesting that a survey be conducted in Delaware. Her memorandum with backup is attached at Tab B. A suggested response to Rose Woods for your signature is attached at Tab C.

Attachments



## DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Marik  
FROM: Ed DeBolt  
SUBJECT: Delaware Test

### PURPOSE

The purpose of the RNC's Delaware Test is to prove that voter perception of President Nixon can be changed or fortified by utilization of selective media and campaign devices. Delaware's modest size and proximity to Washington makes for ease of supervision, low expenses, and relatively inexpensive computer utilization. The test sample is a microcosm of the Northeast, in that it has an urban area (Wilmington), a suburban ring and two rural counties.

### TIMETABLE

June 28: Precinct-by-precinct vote profile analysis will be completed. From this analysis areas of Republicans, Democrats, and "ambivalents" will be identified and displayed visually. The RNC will complete a precinct socio-economic analysis that will locate areas of voters with a potential to support the President based on Census data (1st and 4th count) such as: income, race, housing, education, etc. A state-wide survey commissioned by a Delaware group will be completed and the results will be made available to the RNC.

July 8: An in-depth precinct canvass will commence. Utilizing the precinct and socio-economic analyses and the state-wide survey results, approximately five weathervane, thirty test and thirty control precincts will be canvassed. Approximately one hundred interviews will be conducted in each precinct. The test questions will be developed and the technical supervision will be conducted by Market Opinion Research.

July 20: Utilizing the results of the target precinct canvasses, the first of twenty to thirty tests will be put into the field. The RNC is currently developing the methodology for these tests which will include direct mail techniques, utilization of telephone banks, door - to - door programs, printed flyers and other communication techniques professionally designed to present the President and his programs in a way to favorably stimulate a prospective voter.

September: The test, control, and weathervane precincts will be recanvassed to assess the impact of the twenty to thirty media and campaign tests.

### MANAGEMENT

The RNC will be responsible for all aspects of the Delaware test including management and recruitment of personnel to carry out the test goals.

June 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: ROSE MARY WOODS

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Rose Mary Woods".

John Bucci who, you will recall, is with the Pennsylvania Opinion Poll, has written me as per the attached letter.

I am enclosing the copy of his booklet which he sent to the President and call your attention to his remarks concerning a survey in Delaware, since I do not know what, if any, plans are made for this type program at this time.

Attachments

copy of handwritten letter

Dear Miss Woods:

I thought the President & you would like to have copies of  
our newly issued booklet.

We feel it can be very helpful.

Best wishes - also tell the President it would be very  
valuable to conduct a survey in Delaware at this time.

Mr. Rollins usually arranges for this.

Sincerely,

s/ E. JOHN BUCCI

June 9, 1971

Dear Mr. Bucci:

Many thanks for sending along a copy of your newly issued booklet, "What Really Decides An Election." As you requested, I have passed along to the President the copy which you enclosed for him. I will also pass my copy and your comments about the importance of conducting a survey in Delaware along to the appropriate people.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Rose Mary Woods  
Secretary to the President

Mr. E. John Bucci  
Pennsylvania Opinion Poll  
P. O. Box 266  
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081

cc: Bob Haldeman w/incoming.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROSE MARY WOODS

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

Your memorandum of June 9 described John Bucci's suggestion that a survey be conducted in Delaware.

The RNC is currently involved in a rather massive Delaware survey research project. The initial work has been completed and the questionnaire should go into the field in July.

I will see that you receive the results upon completion of the project in September.

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GS:elr

88  
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# WHAT REALLY DECIDES AN ELECTION

## THE SIX KEY FACTORS



From: LARRY Higby  
TO: Bruce KERRL

*206. file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: \_\_\_\_\_

H. R. HALDEMAN \_\_\_\_\_

I think it important that the President  
see this.

PAT BUCHANAN

---

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

TROUBLE ON THE RIGHT

We have a serious political problem developing on the Right. For some months, the American Conservative Union (Ashbrook, Jeff Bell, the old YAF crowd, Bill Rusher, et alia -- the Reaganites at the Miami Convention) has been harboring a growing cynicism toward the Administration. The disaffection has now spread to include a majority of the younger conservatives. Lately, it is being given national publicity through Evans & Novak; now Thimmesch, and, coming up, David Broder. Originally localized, the infection is spreading and now being broadcast, through the press, to the party structure nationally.

We should anticipate some severe criticism of the Administration at the Annual Conservative Awards Dinner -- which will bring together the entire leadership of the Conservative Movement in Washington in late January.

Briefly, a list of the on-going and new grievances against the President and the Administration would include:

1. The President is adopting a liberal Democratic domestic program, indistinguishable from what an Ed Muskie or Ed Kennedy would propose -- and the President's ability to drag the GOP along behind his proposals makes him a more effective "President Liberal" than any Democrat could possibly be. (The Stewart Alsop column, in Newsweek, attached, was especially damaging in this regard.)

2. The Right, which had felt that RN was luke-warm about FAP, and "understood," now finds the President 100% committed to the program; they see a verbal abandonment of the "workfare" aspect of FAP; the President pushing a national health insurance program of the kind conservatives have fought for years, and actively pursuing a "full employment budget" which will deliberately produce deficits that violate the First Article of GOP Dogma ("balanced budget") for forty years. (In this light, while some of the more knowledgeable and sophisticated Republicans can appreciate the need for economic stimulation, in the form of deficits and "full employment budgets," one has to think the little old ladies who work in the precincts are going to be demoralized by an approach, that seems to say while the old Democratic deficits were evil, this new Republican deficit is good. Similarly, with other Administration initiatives in the social arena, these would have been considered a few years back as hemlock to a good many Republicans -- and we have to be aware of the perplexing impact they are certain to have on our folks in the hinterland.

3. There is no identifiable conservative left in a policy-making position in the Nixon White House. -- Every conservative remaining, is in some form of liaison or P.R. position; thus the hope of a "conservative alternative" in domestic policy is groundless. This complaint has been made with increasing vigor since the departure of Arthur Burns. The original "balance" in the White House staff is now felt to be gone with the departure of Burns and Harlow, and the arrivals of Finch, Rumsfeld, Schultz and MacGregor. Further, a general sense of despair over this situation is traceable to the fact that the domestic structures are now frozen for the duration. Ehrlichman's shop is seen as a small group of pragmatic technicians who can teach it either way; Schultz' operation as Budget Bureau career types who have always leaned to Big Government and statist solutions; and the Cabinet Departments as dominated, in the lower policy-making areas, by liberal hold-over in the bureaucracy. Thus, the options that come up, are solely "liberal" in orientation -- and the President no longer has another "point of view."

4. One of the constant complaints heard is that RN "takes the conservatives for granted; he doesn't think we have anywhere else to go." They feel that they are the dominant force in the Republican Party; yet, the President seems sensitive to them only at election times; they feel themselves to be the "niggers of the Nixon Administration." While they get the "rhetoric," the liberals within the party get the policies and programs. Further, they view the President as ever solicitous of the points of view and sensibilities of the left and the media -- but not so much so of the Right. Their conclusion is more and more that the squeaky wheel in the Nixon Administration gets the grease -- and there are a variety of plans floating about for them to start squeaking publicly.

5. One of the problems emerging is that the party people, the workers, the backbone of the Nixon support for twenty years must be increasingly disheartened by (a) the liberal activist domestic policy of the Administration being pushed so strongly and (b) the reports coming increasingly from columnists of conservatives, party people, and even Republican Congressmen and Governors disenchanted with the Nixon White House. Without the party, without the basically conservative workers enthusiastically and energetically behind us, 1972 will find us in "deep kimshee."

Other points that should be noted:

A. The Evans-Novak column indicating that Reagan was black-listed from a White House established international meeting was damaging, in that it re-fuels the sub-surface talk of a Nixon-Reagan coolness, in the face of Nixon-Rockefeller warmth.

B. While Buckley's influence nationally is enormous, his influence among the hard-core right politicians is being diminished, and we cannot count on his bringing them over. Some of them are caustic -- and Buckley gets a bit of the same constant criticism that conservatives in the White House do -- that they've "sold out."



C. The only criticisms I have received of RN's performance the other night are from the Right. Reportedly, Buckley was disappointed, Kilpatrick expressed the same feeling; and half a dozen or more conservatives have called saying that while the President helped himself nationally, conservatives were appalled at the new emphasis on FAP (away from incentives, and towards "helping minorities,") the comment about Kent State and Jackson State as though the Administration were somehow connected and the enthusiasm with which RN seemed to speak of his "full employment budget," an "expansionary budget ... a budget in deficit."

D. There is serious talk heard now among conservatives to urge Governor Reagan to begin to become a focal point of public opposition to the President's domestic initiatives. Some conservatives close to Reagan don't believe he will move in this direction -- as he is basically not that type. But, at the Awards Dinner, the one annual gathering of the most important conservatives, these kind of things are certain to be talked up -- and promoted.

E. These are sentiments being picked up from the conservative right with which I have some communication. One would imagine that they are also prevalent on the Hill -- and the President should take some soundings from his own people to ascertain if this is not so.

F. Having investigated the Evans-Novak column thing as requested, I am unable to learn who made the quotes -- but have been told repeatedly they are not unrepresentative of a general mood out there.

#### Buchanan's View and Thoughts

The situation on the Right is as bad as I have known it, since joining RN. Some of the departing Right, are not coming back -- given the nature of the new domestic program. But we have to act to retain the allegiance of those drifting off; to retain the support, at least occasion, of the writers -- who are now increasingly dubious. Also, we have to take the steps to stop this constant bickering in

the press within the Party and on the Hill -- about the President not caring, or not consulting, or not listening to the Congressional and Party Regulars.

How this last is done is a problem for our Congressional and political people.

Some suggestions on all these matters:

(a) The need to bring the Congressional wing of the Party in on the take-off of these domestic programs we are contemplating; let the President hear their views on FHIP before it goes and we demand their backing.

(b) There may be a need for RN to get together with the party types on their visits to Washington; and to take a more active role in putting down the complaints that lead to all this negative leakage in the press.

(c) The Conservatives need to be put on notice that their policy alternatives, their program suggestions, from without can get a hearing within. Right now, it is felt there is no conservative programmatic recommendations that can get a hearing in the policy-making procedures of the White House.

(d) There may be a need for the President to bring an identifiable "conservative" in at the Rumsfeld-Finch-Ehrlichman level -- who can be visible as a voice of the Right to which the President will listen, and to whom the Right can take their complaints.

(e) While the President's decisions and directions domestically may be locked in -- perhaps there can be more media emphasis, in terms of speeches and statements and appearances -- on the "Conservative" side of the RN policies.

A foreign policy speech, which explains the need for greater defense expenditures based on Soviet activity and Soviet spending -- would be most welcome. A presidential, or White House emphasis, on what is being done for the Veterans of Vietnam -- which is considerable -- might be helpful. In short,

while recently RN has been given public emphasis to the "liberal" side of the Administration, a corresponding emphasis on the "conservative" side of the Administration could help with the party folks and the country.

(f) The President might himself meet with a representative group of ideological conservatives -- in the writing community, in the Congress -- to hear out their grievances. Many I am sure, having been out of power and favor in Washington for so long, want to be an integral part of the Administration. Given the opportunity, they become the best defenders of the White House in the conservative community we have.

This having been "out" for so long is one reason why conservatives can so quickly adopt a posture of opposition -- it is a role in which, frankly, many of them feel most comfortable. As Bryce once told me, "We have to retain all those guys on the Hill; for ten years, they've been conditioned to bite anything that moves at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue."

(g) Some reports from within indicate that RN plans to do no party meetings whatsoever this year -- not the GOP women, not the Young Republicans in the East Room as last year, etc. I feel this would be a great mistake -- since no one condemns RN for being a party leader; that is a natural and expected role for a President. What the media objection is, is to the "partisanship" of the campaign.

(h) Many of the conservative objections to Administration policy have been and are being refuted on the grounds that conservatives rarely come up with "programs" of their own to present to the President. They recognize this to a great degree -- the idea of a conservative Brookings is always mentioned; and enthusiasm for this kind of idea from the President in a meeting with conservatives like Buckley would be most useful. It is something which needs to be done; it is a conservative short-coming which the Right recognizes.

Finally, I think the problem contains enough potential harm to the Administration, and its future, that I feel that RN should draw the views of other conservatives within -- on all these subjects; people like Bill Timmons, Harry Dent, Tom Huston, Lyn Nofziger, Martin Anderson -- and all the political types who have lines out in the conservative community.

---



PAT BUCHANAN

Phil. Even. Bulletin  
30 Dec 70

Kevin Phillips

ADM

# Color Nixon aides green

## ...for moneyed suburbia



Washington — Presidential Councilors Robert Finch and Donald Rumsfeld are busy these days identifying themselves with a supposed new Nixon political strategy: a moderate, non-ideological pitch aimed at America's fast-growing suburbs.

But the trouble with the White House's outlook is that it is already too suburban, and in a very narrow sense of the word.

Most of the people in the upper echelon of the White House are upper-middle-class lawyers or businessmen from the sort of charcoal-your-own-break suburb normally featured in Doris Day movies. They tend to see America too much in their own image.

### Split-level suburbia

Even suburbia is extremely diverse. There are archetypal, fashionable suburbs like Scarsdale or Shaker Heights, filling up with media managers, urban consultants, and the liberal like. Then there is the more populous split-level suburbia of Republican executives, businessmen and professionals. But most important of all are the vast blue-collar, white-collar and service

...is an obvious target of Republican hopes, yet the White House's political consciousness-cum-suburban strategists are little more attuned to the problems of aerospace Southern California or blue-collar Warren, Mich., than to those of up-country Georgia or the Farm Belt.

Some of the Administration's recent year-round changes suggest that this parochialism may be difficult to shake.

Consider President Nixon's appointment of Donald Rumsfeld, Clark MacGregor, George Bush, and Rogers

## The Evening Bulletin Opinion & Review

B 11

PHILADELPHIA

Wednesday, Dec. 30, 1970

Morton to top jobs.

All of these men are present or former Republican Congressmen, three of them from prosperous suburban districts.

And they are all non-ideological, middle-of-the-road Ivy Leaguers from the hinterland where Ivy League graduates are bourgeois Republicans and not Democratic intellectuals.

None of them have any commitment worth mentioning to Farm Belt, Southern or blue-collar America (or, indeed, too much of anything).

### Needed: new blood

Moreover, all four were among the handful of Congressmen closely associated with Mr. Nixon's 1968 campaign. Three of them were "surrogate" candidates in the 1968 election, authorized to speak for nominee Nixon. The other, Roger Morton, served as Mr. Nixon's floor manager at the 1968 Republican National Convention.

The choice of these men as top-level officials and advisers simply adds to

the image of a White House crippled by a predilection for in-group appointments and cultural sameness when an infusion of new blood and ideas is needed. (Mr. Nixon's other chief White House aides — H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Robert Finch — are also x-campaign aides and longtime in-groupers, as well as typical upper-middle-class suburbanites.)

This staff provincialism played a major part in warping the 1970 campaign, and it plays an important role in what is generally referred to as the President's "isolation." This isolation is not so much physical as cultural.

It is a kind of Howard Johnson's-Book-of-the-Mouth-Club filter through which the problems of Appalachia, the Farm Belt, blue-collar suburbia and the ethnic city sidewalks (to say nothing of black slums) do not pass in any significant way.

### No vision of America

Whatever his aides may be saying about a "suburban strategy," the President knows that his Administration must begin to reach into these other areas. Mr. Nixon is contemplating programs for farmers, smalltown residents, and blue-collar white-collar workers, as well as for youth and blacks, and there are plans to bring representatives of some of these groups into the White House to help shape policy and maintain liaison.

But most of what Mr. Nixon's suburban image-makers and problem-solvers do is skin-deep. Having no vision of America and being sensitive to every cliché uttered by the media, the Administration changes images and strategies as most people change clothes.

## Nixon Discourages Young Conservatives

WASHINGTON — If conservative presidential aide Martin Anderson leaves the Nixon administration, as he is considering, his departure will not receive the fanfare accorded that of Interior Secretary Hickel or White House counselor Daniel P. Moynihan.

However, Anderson's weariness with Nixonian Washington is important because of a broader symbolism. To be sure, the 33-year-old scholar's own background is impressive: systems analysis, he was formerly a professor at Columbia University, author of "The Federal Bulldozer" (a well-received critique of liberal urban programming and philosophy). More significantly though, he is the last of the young, program-oriented conservative lawyers and academics who gained prominence from their roles in the 1968 campaign.

Among the departed or disillusioned:

John Sears, now with the Washington law firm of Gadsby and Hannah, began working for Mr. Nixon in 1966 and rose to become deputy counsel to the President and White House "political man" in January, 1969. Sideline within a few months, he resigned in September, 1969. During the 1970 campaign, he criticized the administration's lack of programming and ideology.

Richard Whalen is back as writer-in-residence at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies when, in 1967, he joined the Nixon presidential campaign as a speechwriter. Whalen left the entourage in August, 1968, after a quarrel over the high command's lack of interest in spelling out new policies for America.

New York business consultant Alan Greenspan, chief of domestic policy research in the 1968 Nixon campaign, from the start de-

clined to serve in Washington. Recently, in a speech to the National Association of Business Economists, he deplored the trend of federal welfare spending and urged "some major changes in the way we handle our fiscal political apparatus."

Richard V. Allen, now with King Resources in Denver, served as chief of foreign policy research in the 1968 campaign, and then briefly as a deputy to Henry Kissinger. Allen left because of discontent and trouble regarding his academic background.

To this list should be added the name of Roger Freeman, a senior staff member of the Hoover Institute, who served briefly as a special assistant to the President, leaving in June, 1970, because he felt that conservative views were receiving short shrift from the President and his advisers. In a speech that month in Seattle, Freeman declared that the White House had turned its back on the educational program innovations promised in 1968, in favor of the status quo desired by liberal groups.

Apart from the discouraged Martin Anderson, the only well known young conservative in the White House left from 1968 is speechwriter Pat Buchanan. Liberals have taken over almost every policy, as opposed to liaison or public relations, position.

Back in the spring of 1968, candidate Nixon said: "We can't go with just good people . . . We have to go with the best, really first-raters." He singled out young conservatives: The Whalens, Andersons, and Buchanans.

But this is the winter of 1970. And the young men of spring 1968, who hoped for new programs and coalitions -- for an articulation of American alienation from liberalism -- have left or are thinking about it.

ESP 2/19

# NIXON TO THE LEFT OF HIMSELF

WASHINGTON—In his farewell address at the White House, President Nixon's favorite liberal Democrat, Daniel P. Moynihan, credited the Nixon Administration with "much genuine achievement." And yet, he added, more in resentment than in anger, "how little the Administration is credited with what it has done." ... Depressing, even depressing, things are being said about the Administration. "They are not true," says Moynihan, "but they have substance to them." ... To see why, let us look at the record of Richard M. Nixon, the man usually, Kennedy-type liberalism, had been elected President in 1968. Let us suppose that in his first year in office this Democrat-called liberal, President Liberal—had done the following things:

1. Ordered the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, to be substantially completed by the end of his first term. ... Let us suppose serious negotiations had begun. President Liberal has done more, a cease-fire, made clear that a comprehensive settlement need not be based on elections run by the Saigon government, and offered a total withdrawal of American troops soon after such a settlement. The Communist side has refused to discuss these proposals, but meanwhile the political and military situation in Vietnam improved.

2. Announced a new "doctrine," designed to reduce U.S. global commitments—especially in the Middle East, where President Liberal has committed the United States more than ever before to a costly, and in line with the new doctrine, President Liberal has cut back on commitments. In real terms, more than at any time since 1945.

3. Announced an economic policy of "stagflation" reduction. To stimulate the economy, President Liberal has announced a budget of a large budget deficit, to be financed by the Federal Reserve Bank, an expansionist monetary policy.

4. Announced the most far-reaching legislative program in American history that "for the first time in American history we in this country establish a floor price for every American commodity." ... President Liberal has announced a budget, to submit a bill to Congress, as well as a \$5 billion anti-inflation scheme, along with a program of "liberal Kennedy.

The point needs no further laboring—President Liberal's program is, of course, President Nixon's. If President Liberal were actually in the White House, it is not at all hard to imagine the reaction to his program. The right would be assailing President Liberal for bugging out of Vietnam, undermining American defenses, fiscal irresponsibility, and galloping socialism. The four basic Presidential policy positions listed above would be greeted with hosannas by the liberals.

Instead, the liberals have showered the President with dead cats, while most conservatives have maintained a glum silence, and thus the Administration has been "little credited" for "much genuine achievement." But there are certain special reasons, which Pat Moynihan omitted to mention, why this is so.

For one thing, there is a sort of unconscious conspiracy between the President and his natural enemies, the liberal Democrats, to conceal the extent to which his basic program, leaving aside frills and rhetoric, is really the liberal Democratic program. Richard Nixon is the first professional politician and "real Republican" to be elected President in 40 years—and it is not in the self-interest of the liberals to give credit to such a President for liberal initiatives. By the same token, it is not in the self-interest of the President to risk his conservative constituency by encouraging the notion that he is not a "real Republican" after all, but a liberal Democrat at cut rates.

## OBFUSCATION

There are plenty of examples of the mutual obfuscation which results from this mutual interest. The withdrawal of half a million men from Vietnam is quite obviously the greatest retreat in American history. But the President talks as though it were somehow a glorious advance, certain to guarantee a "just and lasting peace." When the President—like any commander of a retreat—resorts to spoiling actions to protect his dwindling rear guard, the liberals howl that he is "chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of military victory."

When the President cuts back real military strength more sharply than in a quarter of a century, the liberals attack him for failing to "reorder priorities." The President, in his rhetoric about a "strong defense," plays the same game. The result, as John Kenneth Galbraith accurately noted recently, is that "most

people and maybe most congressmen think the Administration is indulging the Pentagon even more than the Democrats," which is the precise opposite of the truth.

During the campaign, the President talked a good deal of the time as though the family-assistance plan, in principle the most radical domestic proposal since the New Deal, were simply a way of getting lazy good-for-nothings off the relief rolls. The liberals played along, suggesting that the plan was some sort of niggardly reactionary scheme, and supporting it tepidly if at all.

## DR. FELL

There is also a human element in this exercise in mutual obfuscation. To the liberals, especially the liberal commentators who dominate the media, Richard Nixon is Dr. Fell ("The reason why I cannot tell, but this I know and know full well, I do not like thee, Dr. Fell"). This is not surprising. Not too many years ago, Richard M. Nixon was one of the most effective—and least lovable—of the conservative Republican professionals of the McCarthy era.

There is good reason to suppose, moreover, that in his political instinct, Mr. Nixon is really well to the right of President Nixon. In fact, on his past record, it is not at all hard to imagine R.M. Nixon leading the assault on the President for "bug-out," "fiscal irresponsibility," "galloping socialism," and all the rest of it. So how can one expect Mr. Nixon to defend President Liberal's program with the passionate conviction that a President Robert Kennedy, say, would have brought to the defense of such a program?

A President—any President—is a captive of the national situation. Any President, by whatever name, would now be withdrawing from Vietnam, or proposing a basic change in the horrible welfare system, or accepting a deficit, and so on. The President's dilemma is that the national situation has pushed him to the left of himself, while his natural constituency and his natural mind yet, as reflected in his appointments and his rhetoric, keep pushing him to the right. One result is that "much genuine achievement" tends to be overlooked, to be replaced by a sense of wandering, a seeming lack of direction or conviction. In this way, the President's dilemma is the country's dilemma too.

WP  
12-17-76

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

## Darkening Republican Mood

SUN VALLEY, Idaho—Beneath the surface criticism of President Nixon at the Republican Governors' Conference here was the deeper, more ominous anxiety that Mr. Nixon's formidable reputation as a practical politician may prove to be one of the great myths of contemporary politics.

At the end of the governors' festive evening on Sunday, defeated Gov. Claude R. Kirk of Florida pulled a wad of bills from his hip pocket, peeled off \$100 and offered an open bet that the Republican ticket in 1972 would not be headed by Richard M. Nixon.

For Lame-duck Kirk, whose irrepressible antics provided the only light touch in the three-day winter meeting of the Republican governors, the \$100 bet was a reflection of the profound uneasiness that gripped the large majority of Republican governors after two years of the Nixon presidency.

In fact, the strength of this mood of anxiety was the chief factor behind the gov-

ernor's decision not to hurl any public thunderbolts at Mr. Nixon's handling of the presidency, from the creeping economic crisis to the botched November election campaign. As one Midwestern governor who survived November told us: "That would only make matters worse. We're all on the same life raft."

PRIVATELY, however, the list of grievances against the Nixon White House tells a story of blatant political ineptitude, much of it concealing a callous disregard of the Republican governors. Matters of perhaps small significance in themselves, these grievances inevitably establish Mr. Nixon's declining credibility as a shrewd party leader.

Last August, for example, when Lame-duck Gov. Don Sawyer of Idaho faced a state problem of crisis proportions, he telephoned the White House asking for no more than 10 minutes on the telephone with Mr. Nixon, at the President's convenience. Impossible that day, he was informed. He tried again, several days later, with the same result. Samu-

elson, who has never had a private talk with Mr. Nixon since he entered the White House but used to dine at the White House with Lyndon Johnson, finally got his 10 minutes on the phone—but with his old friend Vice President Spiro Agnew, not Mr. Nixon.

Likewise, when retiring Gov. David Cargo of New Mexico was pointedly asked by the President last fall what job he might like in the administration, Irish-Catholic Cargo said he could think of only one: ambassador to Ireland. Fine, said Mr. Nixon, send me a note to remind me.

Several weeks after sending the note, Cargo got an answer from White House political aide Murray Chotiner saying that his letter had been referred "to the proper people" and that if Cargo got a favorable response Chotiner would like to hear about it.

IF MR. NIXON were succeeding in his larger goal of making the Republicans the majority party, this inattentive list of grievances could be dismissed as petty griping. Instead, many of the most thoughtful governors here

perceive the President's inability or refusal to understand and deal with their own problems as symptomatic of his failure to reach that larger goal.

Thus, instead of growth they fear a shrinking party which, on the national level, is driving away blacks and youth with little compensating gains in the middle class—largely because of the lethal combination of unemployment and inflation.

Evidence of how deep this anxiety really runs is found in Kentucky Gov. Louie Nunn's private decision to give up his earlier plan to run for the Senate in 1972, after his present term ends. Instead, he now plans to accept a federal judgeship. The obvious reason: 1972 begins to look like a disaster year for Mr. Nixon's party.

The President thus confronts a crisis of confidence with his own Republican governors, now reduced from 32 to 21, which would surely have exploded into nasty headlines were it not for their fears that washing the party laundry in public, far from cleaning up the crisis, would simply make it dirtier.

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*Richard Nixon and Robert Kennedy*  
*History Among Republicans*

*History*

DAVID PERKINS DID NOT  
 NIXON somehow slipped  
 unseem into the Dec. 15 re-  
 treatment party at the Wash-  
 ington Hotel for Assistant  
 Republican National Chair-  
 man Elly Peterson, he might  
 well have felt a kinship for  
 Capt. Hugh on the bridge of  
 E.M.S. Kennedy.

Revealing in itself did pro-  
 Peterson's list for the party  
 included only one presiden-  
 tial assistant, Leonard Gar-  
 denet (who appeared and  
 briefly). Also revealing not  
 another White House aide  
 behaved to drop in, despite  
 the long tradition of open  
 hospitality at political recep-  
 tions. Thus freed from inhi-  
 bitions, Republican politi-  
 cians (including several ad-  
 ministration officials) who  
 crowded the bar and buffet  
 let their hair down in a way  
 that can fairly be described  
 as raucous.

Although there was noth-  
 ing so un-Republican as talk-  
 about a quixotic dump-  
 Nixon movement, the presi-  
 dent was not blessed with a  
 single kind word. Moreover,  
 conversation that might re-  
 flect that numerous talk-  
 among Republicans has  
 been rising, notwithstanding  
 since the Nov. 3 election—a  
 truth still not appreciated  
 by the White House.

THIS DARK MOOD is  
 reminiscent of the earlier

reced pervading Washington  
 three years ago, all the  
 more remarkable because it  
 lacks the focal issue (Viet-  
 nam) or the organization  
 (the dump-Johnson move-  
 ment) that destroyed Presi-  
 dent Johnson.

Because Mr. Nixon's ver-  
 bal punishment may not fit  
 his crime, this could be a  
 night-term measure that soon  
 will pass. Transitory or not,  
 however, what Republicans  
 are saying privately merits  
 study. All of what follows  
 comes from card-carrying  
 Republicans across the par-  
 ty's entire ideological spec-  
 trum:

Item: One high-level  
 Nixon administration offi-  
 cial, deeply involved in poli-  
 cy-making, confided that the  
 administration is undergo-  
 ing a "crisis of the spirit."  
 Why? "I don't know, but I've  
 had a hellful of (Attorney  
 General) John Mitchell."

Item: An Eastern liberal  
 Republican senator arranged  
 a meeting with conservative  
 businessmen angry over his  
 Senate positions. To his  
 amazement, they ignored his  
 sins of liberalism and pointed  
 out vituperation against Mr.  
 Nixon's handling of the eco-  
 nomy.

Item: A part-time consult-  
 ant to the Nixon administra-  
 tion was perplexed and trou-  
 bled after a long meeting

with high Nixon aides,  
 "they are detached," said  
 the consultant, "as if they  
 are executives running  
 somebody else's govern-  
 ment."

Item: A leading Republi-  
 can pollster has informed  
 clients that Mr. Nixon may  
 be unable to carry any of  
 the 10 most populous states  
 in 1972. Hence, his prefer-  
 red advice to Republican  
 office-seekers: avoid identifi-  
 cation with the President.

Item: Two Republican  
 governors have decided to  
 refuse telephone calls from  
 one of the President's top  
 political aides, their way of  
 registering discontent with  
 Nixon party politics.

Item: A group of politi-  
 cally active conservatives  
 has decided to ask Gov. Ron-  
 ald Reagan of California to  
 publicly criticize President  
 Nixon's "high spending"—  
 not preliminary to a dump-  
 Nixon operation but to pres-  
 sure the President back to-  
 ward orthodoxy.

Item: One Nixon adminis-  
 tration presidential ap-  
 pointee, a liberal but always  
 a party regular, has made  
 inquiries about John Gard-  
 ner's Common Cause, an  
 embryonic third-party vehi-  
 cle. The reason: "What place  
 is there in this administra-  
 tion for my kind of Republi-  
 can?"

Item: At an informal din-

ner of sub-Cabinet-level of-  
 ficials, one assistant secre-  
 tary whose Nixon connec-  
 tions date back to early  
 presidential campaign days  
 said in despair: "Now on  
 each ear I get word to  
 those people"—"those peo-  
 ple" meaning the White  
 House.

ADDITIONAL ITEMS to  
 spare can be pasted on this  
 mosaic of distrust, disillu-  
 sion, and alienation. In  
 truth, what the Republicans  
 are saying is harsher than  
 most criticism in the press  
 or by the Democrats. Its  
 sharpness derives partly  
 from low expectations of im-  
 provement.

Accordingly, cosmetic  
 changes—more press confer-  
 ences, greater presidential  
 accessibility, more attention  
 to domestic affairs—will not  
 reach the roots of disen-  
 tent. As a few presidential  
 advisers perceive, Mr. Nix-  
 on's problems are neither  
 concrete nor small but en-  
 brace large questions of con-  
 fidence and leadership.

In that gloomy perception  
 may be found Mr. Nixon's  
 political salvation—that and  
 the President's own remark-  
 able history. Having been  
 resurrected once from politi-  
 cal oblivion, he certainly  
 cannot be counted out yet as  
 a victim of his present tor-  
 ments.

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CONSERVATIVES COMPLAIN ABOUT NIXON

BY NICK THOMPSON

(C) 1971, Newsday, Inc.

WASHINGTON -- The difficulties Mr. Nixon experiences in positioning himself as a centrist President are immediately revealed in the steady complaining heard from conservatives and right-wingers who feel unrequited love.

The President already has liberals, some moderates, and much of the communications and intellectual apparatus against him. And Dr. Gallop, that sober diagnostician of national feeling, hasn't been too kind to him lately. This week he proclaimed that while President Nixon tops the "Most Admired Man" list in 1970, his vote is "considerably smaller than that recorded in last year's annual audit."

The President is accustomed to liberal disfavor, but to have conservatives dog him, well, it must test his patience.

This week, "Battle Line," the monthly publication of the American Conservative Union (counterpart to the liberal Americans for Democratic Action), ominously headlined: "Twenty-Four Months Left for Nixon?"

Assessing Nixon at mid-point in his first term, "Battle Line" said: "...we think we can say conservatives are no longer even getting the words. Only the knife." The words being "rhetorical libations poured by Vice President Agnew..."

"Battle Line" is bitter about "the fact that Richard Nixon is supposed to be a Republican President...the ringing phrases of conservative philosophy which enshrouded the Nixon welfare bill... National Health Insurance..." It suggests that the Nixon line is: "Appease Red China. Encourage red trade. SALT talks forever. Cut defense costs to the bone. Get out of Vietnam, with only the pace of withdrawal the issue. Victory? Barry Goldwater's beloved blockading of Haiphong? No, sir."

Now this is pungent stuff, like most of that spun by ideologues of the left and right. But "Human Events," another conservative publication, also charges the President with refusing to cut spending, claims the Administration wants to launch spending binges for new social programs, and blames "such failures as wasting the taxpayer's revenue as Robert Finch and anti-poverty warrior Donald Rumsfeld."

Conservatives are sore at the Nixon Administration's centrist-to-progressive domestic program, however poorly it has been presented to the Congress. At most, they give reluctant support to his Vietnamization program and effort to reduce the American presence elsewhere in the world.

Beyond that, individual conservatives are irked with the manner the White House treats them. Goldwater wishes somebody would have given him better research and briefing on the SSF so he could have argued for it early on the Senate floor. Texas Sen. John Tower is miffed because the President waited until only two hours before announcing the nomination of John Connolly as Treasury Secretary before letting Tower know. Other conservatives complain they can't get through the White House bureaucracy, a gripe echoed by liberals as well.

Conservatives with strong convictions are like liberals with strong convictions--they are likely to be the quickest to be disappointed by the leader they think they own. When conservatives have a talk with themselves and think it all over, they know they have nowhere else to go but to Nixon. John Tower, who was a key figure in holding off the Reagan threat to Nixon's nomination in 1968, isn't about to bolt to another candidate. Indeed, Reagan himself knows he has only the most remote opportunity of becoming a factor in the 1972 presidential picture.

So Conservatives will have to console themselves with the knowledge that a liberal doesn't sit in the White House; that the government is taking a firmer line on law-and-order; that the Supreme Court is swinging back to center; and that, gee, Bill Buckley of those Conservative Buckylys was appointed to the advisory commission of the United States Information Agency.

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FROM: NEWSDAY SPECIALS  
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485 MICHIGAN AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022, AREA CODE 212, D-7157

697 "CONSERVATIVE VIEW" JAMES J. HANCOCK

FOR PUBLICATION SATURDAY/SUNDAY, JANUARY 9/16, 1971.

In Washington: Snow, Sleet and Fog

WASHINGTON.

It was raining in Washington Monday night when the President wet with his four inquisitors--a slow, bone-chilling rain, just this side of sleet, the gutters full of slush and the Washington Monument lost in a dismal fog.

To a reporter abroad in the city, late that night, the evening offered an odd combination of illusion and reality: The cozy room on a TV tube, and outside the streets snow-mottled; a confident President in the White House, a wrecked truck on an icy parkway; bright lights in a library, red flares in a drizzle.

"1971 will be a good year," Mr. Nixon told the correspondents, "and 1972 will be a very good year." It was the identical prediction, down to the very words, syllables and inflection, that Mr. Nixon had offered another group of correspondents on November 5. There is nothing either good or bad, said Hamlet, but thinking makes it so. The Prince of Denmark was talking to Rosencrantz of prisons.

To what extent, a reporter wonders, is the President a prisoner of illusion? Where does the slush end, the curb begin? Mr. Nixon's greatest domestic problem lies in combatting inflation; his first weapon, he says, will be an expansionary budget. And what kind of budget will this be? It will be another deficit budget, but it "will not exceed full employment revenues."

Flares sputter, monuments vanish. What in this ghostly night are "full employment revenues"? Such revenues, one assumes, are the revenues the Treasury would take in if--if there were full employment. But full employment is not in prospect. The best Mr. Nixon can hope for in the year ahead is an unemployment rate of perhaps 5 percent. One peers through a windshield darkly. No full employment revenues can be perceived.

(MORE)

The major thrust of his State of the Union message, says the President, will go toward a *new* plan for sharing Federal revenue with the States. Splendid. But is it a splendid dream or a splendid reality? The concept of revenue-sharing, with no strings attached, is an old, familiar concept. It has hung around Congress for 20 years or more. Mr. Eisenhower was a great one for revenue-sharing. He wanted to take the Federal tax on telephone bills and transfer the income as a token of affection to the States. But whenever Ike called for help up on the Hill, all the lines were busy.

Mr. Nixon sees a good year ahead. He sees it from the library, with Mr. Seversid in a wing chair, nodding. Here on the parkway at midnight, a tow-truck is straining, its orange eye revolving, and the view ahead is rather different. Next month the threat of a rail strike returns. Steelworkers start negotiating in the early spring. Longshoremen, aluminum workers, coal miners, glassmakers--all these are waiting in line; and they seek expansionary budgets also.

Mr. Seversid inquires of the President: What has been your greatest disappointment? It is the failure of Congress, says Mr. Nixon, to approve a Family Assistance Plan. But how did a Republican President--a putatively conservative President--get so *obsessed* with a plan to double or triple the welfare rolls? In any version (and the White House has sent up half a dozen versions), the plan would transfer millions of families to a new dependency on public dole. Yet the Senate's refusal to achieve this dubious goal is the President's greatest disappointment.

Well, it is a foggy night in this frozen town, and the President's road is patched with ice. "Slippery when wet," the sign says, and 1971 promises to be a wet year and 1972 a very wet year. Maybe Mr. Nixon can make it safely home. The market is trending up; interest rates are easing down. The outlook is for personal income, after taxes, of some \$740 billion this year. December's retail sales were good. Things could be worse.

Have confidence. That was the President's prayer on Monday. It's something the country would like to have, but right now we are creeping behind a tow-truck slowly, remembering real Aprils in the midst of a winter night.

4377



01/10/14  
 Program Development &  
 Business Admin. Dev.









CHART I  
Current Organization of  
Republican National Committee



Assistant Chairman  
E. Peterson

Women's Activities

Chairman  
R. Morf

Finance Chairman  
J. Milbank

POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
Deputy Chair  
J. Allison

RESEARCH DIVISION

Director  
R. Jungmann

Systems  
Coordinator

Executive  
Secretary

Programmer

Programmer

Secretary

Assistant  
Director

Assistant  
Director

Library

Librarian

Clipping Bureau  
Manager

Miracode  
Manager

Public Opinion  
Assistant

Elections  
Statistics  
Assistant

Film File  
Assistant

Research Assistants

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

Director  
G. Wade

Admin. Asst.

Executive  
Secretary

Receptionist

Daily Mailing Lists  
Supervisor

Media Relations  
Director

Creative Services  
Director

Publications  
Director

Assistant

Assistant

Archives

Assistant

Art Director

Assistant

Blair

Sp

S

The Attorney General  
H. R. Haldeman  
January 21, 1971  
page 6

- . Robert Jungman be replaced as Director of the Research Division by a broad analytical thinker with some management experience
- . Frank Leonard be appointed as Manager of Communication Services

Very little is known about other RNC personnel to make a fair evaluation. Senator Dole and Tom Evans should asses their needs early and make the acquisition of top-flight personnel their first priority.

Fred Malek would be able to assist in the recruitment of needed top-level personnel. Some of these people might be found already within the Federal Government.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

6. Mrs. Armstrong assumes control of three functions -- the Women's Division, Special Programs, and affiliate liaison (NFRW, YR, CYR, and RGA). If her role should become more public relations oriented, with a heavy speaking schedule on appropriate issues (consumer affairs and the economy, women's role in the 1970's, etc.), the operational functions of her job could be placed under the Political Division.
7. The Political Division is revamped to give special focus to Special Groups and to Political Service. An Assistant Director of the Political Division for Special Groups, as well as a Manager for each group, should assist to develop this significant service area.
8. A special assistant for scheduling and advancing is added to the Chairman's office to assure proper arrangements are made for the Chairman's travels. Ron Walker has advance men available who could fulfill this function well.
9. A general purpose special assistant is added to Co-Chairman Evans' office for his personal needs.

#### RECOMMENDED PERSONNEL ACTIONS

Since organizational shifts alone will not change the RNC, it is recommended that the following personnel actions be taken:

- . a replacement for Bob Hitt be found to take over the Administration Division
- . Bill Low remain as Director of the Political Division
- . Gordon Wade be replaced as Director of the Communications Division by a creative marketing type of person who also has broad management skills

- . to provide creative approaches to selling the President's programs. For example, brochures should be developed for the Manager, Heritage Groups which point out "What the President Has Done for the \_\_\_\_\_" (Polish, Italian, etc.); arrangements should be made for the President to be filmed with appropriate Heritage groups in appropriate places in the course of Presidential, "non-political" travels.
  - . to develop appropriate positions for attacking the Democratic Party and its leading Presidential contenders
  - . to provide the Chairman, on his speaking and political travels, with a high-level companion who can speak with authority to local press and local politicians
4. The Communications Division is broadened from the existing "production shop" to a creative marketing division with strengthened media services, the addition of a Special Groups feature desk and a speech writer, the tying together of all productions (publications, brochures, films, etc.) under a Communications Services Group, and the addition of a separate Direct Mail operation. With the increasing importance of direct mail, this operation should be separate and provided with the necessary resources to expand.
  5. The Research Division retains a statistical research section, but loses data processing to the Administration Division. Statistical research is a creative function, while data processing is an on-going technical service function. Under the direction of the Deputy Chairman, this Division should supply the Chairman and Co-Chairman with creative substantive input on issues.

special groups, and campaign guidelines. The RNC's strength and usefulness to both the President and State Committees will depend directly on its ability to provide such services.

#### RECOMMENDED STRUCTURAL CHANGES

The RNC is currently organized around distinct program or operating responsibilities, as shown in Chart I. To shift from this orientation to mission support and to ensure the limited resources (50 professional personnel and \$6 million budget) are focused on this mission, the RNC organization should be modified, as shown in Chart II.

1. Tom Evans, as Chief Operating Officer, becomes primarily responsible for implementing the RNC mission and for coordinating all Committee activities through Mrs. Armstrong, a Deputy Chairman for Political Affairs, a Deputy Chairman for Communications, and four Division Directors. Tom Evans' desire to be "Mr. Inside", his take charge attitude, and his proven managerial skills make him particularly fitted for this role.
2. The position of Deputy Chairman for Political Affairs is retained. However, its function shifts from principal operating officer of the Committee to political service and get-out-the-vote functions (Administration Division and Political Division). This Deputy Chairman is to implement the RNC's mission of providing organizational and technical support services.
3. The position of Deputy Chairman for Communications is created to implement the RNC's mission of developing and implementing a creative information and education program. The Research Division and Communications Division, which many people have previously urged be combined, are linked under this Deputy Chairman. The prime functions of this office are:
  - to give the Research and Communications Divisions proper direction to ensure the compilation of necessary information for appropriate users in usable form and in a timely manner

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: POLITICAL MEMORANDUM  
THE PR CAMPAIGN

We face an increasingly serious political problem in the rising crescendo of news stories about the "image makers" in the White House. It reached a new level this weekend, when Bob Pierpoint went on network television news for the first time with his theme of "twenty-two image makers" now on the White House staff, following the three additions, who are allegedly the ones counseling the President to make the recent spate of public appearances. Others are certain to pick up the line, using the arrivals of Scali and Moore as their take-off point.

Further, both Humphrey and Muskie have touched on the matter, (HHH accusing us of "public relations gimmickry) and if pressed, it could present a serious problem for if there is anything that turns off Middle America, it is Madison Avenue.

Secondly, for every minor color item we have moved into the media, there has probably been one major story on the "new effort to humanize the President." This latter theme coursing through the national media is decidedly not to our advantage. One wonders if the trade-off was worth it between the Barbara Walters Show/Potomac Nine Interview on the one hand -- and all the news stories about what we were actually up to on the other.

While I do not have any complete answers to this problem, I think it is a serious one, which could become quite serious in the 1972 campaign; and herewith some thoughts:

First, we should de-escalate the time and energy and thought spent on pushing little "color anecdotes about the President -- and shift our emphasis on associating the President with "accomplishments" of his Administration. The President did not get here by being warm and human and witty and charming -- he got here by being capable and tough and qualified and politically courageous. And if we stay here, it will be because of those latter virtues and accomplishments -- not the former. I do not recommend that we eschew altogether telling the press and media anecdotes and stories which flesh out the President's personality. But if we are relying on that, we are in trouble. And further the efforts to push these to the press becomes at once counter-productive, as Ziegler tells me; for the press room quickly buzzes with the story that we are "pushing" these materials. And they insert in future stories that the "PR campaign" is geared up again.

Again, in speeches and interviews and backgrounders, the colorful anecdote is useful, and should be utilized -- but this effort should not call forth the present institutionalized effort. More than one friendly reporter has told me we "are turning people off," with these efforts.

Frankly, the one in the best position to drop the "anecdotes" about a meeting is Ron Ziegler, or some official who has "reason" to be in the meeting -- where it occurs -- a reason other than there to write up the color. Example: PJB attends the Congressional leadership meetings; it is an easy and natural thing to do when asked about that meeting to relay the anecdotes. But unless it's an extraordinary incident, a phone call from me to Time to "tell" them the anecdote will produce an entry in the "Time File" to the effect that we are out pushing anecdotes.

The McGinnis Book leaves us far more vulnerable than we might otherwise be to this type of political attack.

One concern about press conferences is that invariably the media zeroes in on "Vietnam," an issue on which every American has probably made up his mind, and every American is tired of hearing debated and discussed. Thus, the President's decision to hold the second conference -- Saturday -- and to focus it on domestic affairs, was the right one. For once, the President could swing out a little, hit the marijuana thing, hit those who create "hysteria" in this country by raising the spectre of police



state. He could talk about unemployment in Southern California; could put the needle to Humphrey "who I am glad is going to support us." In short the range of opportunities for the President to expand on what we have done, and what positions we take was a golden one. It is time the President was associated with his popular political positions, more often in the press, time we were more closely identified with what we have done in the area of environment, etc. All those things that give the President the "activist" problem-solving image which the liberal press has made the sine qua non of the successful President.

We ought to find out the major concerns of the American people, "their issues" and wed the President's public appearances to those concerns. Surely, the President's appearance at Pendleton was directly consistent with this. We ought not to make the mistake of thinking "our" issues, i. e. revenue sharing and reorganization, are the concerns of the public: we should find out for sure the concerns of those national communities, ethnic, racial, political -- and associate ourselves with them. Again, this does not argue for abandoning our "six great goals" at all -- these have given us the stamp of an activist progressive administration; but if we are to rally great enthusiasm for the President, then we must closely identify with issues where their enthusiasm resides. One example: As of this point (9 a.m. Monday) certainly the capital city and perhaps the country's point of concern is the hell-raisers in Washington. As of now, the President should be given the credit for sweeping out that park; the President might well make a public gesture to the Washington Police and the troops who have done a first-rate job of police work.

Just a guess -- but we ought to be prepared for some in-depth pieces on the President's "public relations men." The press has been sniffing around this story for some time; and my guess is that, with Pierpoint's piece and recent arrivals, we can expect some along these lines.

Finally, I think that what we have to sell is competence, not personality, a strong capable successful President, not Mr. Nice Guy. We should make every effort to destroy the myths about the President that have been created over twenty-five years -- but we should not depend upon this to see us through. We should recognize that the people have an impression about the President built up over years and decades of time -- and twelve months is not going to change that impression perceptibly.

Attached is a clipping by a normally hostile John Pierson, a fellow who generally finds it next to impossible to write well of us -- yet, he has something here.

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN



THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1971

Personal and Confidential

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: John Mitchell

RE: Attached

Attached is the proposal of Bill Brock concerning which I spoke to you on the telephone last week.

I subscribe completely to Brock's concept of where the Nixon youth votes will come from and propose to recommend that he proceed with his proposal unless you have reservations.

Bill Brock's activity should, of course, be coordinated with whatever Bob Finch will be doing in the youth area out of the White House.

## DRAFT PROPOSAL - YOUNG VOLUNTEERS FOR NIXON

I would like to begin now building a "Young Volunteers for Nixon" campaign team.

As a partisan of this Administration, I have reached the end of my rope with those political jeremiahs whose myopic and occasionally paranoid view of current problems is allowed to obscure the obvious need for a unity of purpose and planning today so that we may enable the President to achieve his deserved mandate in 1972. It's time to get back on track.

My request is predicated upon five perceived conditions: First, that there exists within the 18 to 22 age group a potential of more than 5 million votes for Richard Nixon; second, that potential exists regardless of any existing philosophical and party lines; third, it is dependent more upon the magnitude and quality of our efforts to obtain it than upon any other single factor; fourth, there exists today no organization or method, either at the state or national level, to achieve this goal; and, finally, I believe in Tennessee we established a design which can be implemented on a national basis to do so.

Attached hereto as Appendix I, is a short survey of my "Young Volunteers for Brock" organization in Tennessee in 1970. While obviously sketchy, I believe it will give you an indication of the kind of effort which can be made in virtually any state in the Union.

Appendix II is a broadly stated design concept for implementation of a national "Young Volunteers for Nixon" campaign. Essentially its objective is to achieve the mobilization and coordination of more than 500,000 new workers for the President in this particular age group. While I hope the attached addenda will speak for themselves in program terms, I think

it is important to establish at this point the feasibility of such an operation (the desirability of such a goal is obvious).

Based upon my own experience, this generation offers fantastic potential for the Republican Party. While it may or may not be "the most misunderstood generation in history", as some of its college groups would have you believe, there is no question that it can be subjected to the greatest political miscalculation in recent times.

I've seen the polls saying that 37% consider themselves to be liberal and 40% middle of the road. As a matter of fact, my staff has spent the last several weeks collecting every obtainable data source on this subject that we could find. Virtually all these sources concede the college generation considers itself more "liberal" than its elders. Virtually none have probed the philosophic base of this semantic identification on campus, and literally none have explored the philosophy and preference of the non-college young - even though this latter group constitutes 2/3 of the whole and, paranthetically, is unquestionably more "conservative" than their contemporaries on campus.

Thus it is toward the working young that I propose we direct a major campaign effort. This group of new voters offers more opportunity for the Republican Party than any other - yet it is almost totally ignored today by politicians and political analysts alike.

At the same time, we can add the potential of college youth. In this regard, I believe we can stress to advantage smaller state universities, community colleges, vocational and technical institutes, and private and parochial institutions. As with the "working young" these offer a group with a higher yield/effort factor.

Based upon my experience with the 22 member Campus Task Force, one fact comes through loud and clear, no matter where you are, North, South, East or West, no matter what kind of campus you are on, liberal, conservative, rich, poor, private, parochial or public. It is that this generation is desperate in its search for personal identity and a sense of meaningful involvement. Of course every conversation begins with Vietnam, the environment, racial intolerance, and the rest; but the longer you talk and the more you probe, the more eloquent the plea becomes for a chance to live one's own life and to have a meaningful voice in one's future - to be able to effect the course of events, to feel a sense of contribution, of participation. Admittedly many are not able to articulate their frustration, but its essential cause can not be hidden, nor can we afford to overlook the implications of such a condition.

The central fact of this circumstance is that the desire for participation and constructive activity overrides all other issues, both emotional and intellectual. It can be capitalized on to the advantage of not only the Republican party and its presidential nominee, but of the young people as well.

Thus, I think the first condition of any political effort is that we disabuse ourselves of the semantical shibboleths which currently prevent not only understanding but even communication, on the part of young and old alike. Our young are not a collection of nihilists and hedonists, as some of their elders apparently believe. Nor are they wedded to the paternalism of the Democratic party and its apparent principles, as some of the youth themselves would indicate by their adopted labels and slogans.

Thus it is my contention, and deeply rooted conviction, that if our campaign not only asks for their help, but also allows these individuals to become involved in a meaningful way, it can expect a remarkable response. Let me stress again one additional factor: for every young person in college, there are two of his contemporaries either gainfully employed in a civilian occupation, serving in the military, or acting as a housewife. Even if we accept the major / <sup>college</sup> political charts indicating tendencies away from our nominee - and I would not for one minute do so if we act now to correct condition - the remaining base of 12 million non-college new voters offers a political opportunity of incredible magnitude.

Let me recall (with a pardonable degree of relish) my experience of last year. I was running against our Southern super-dove and liberal Albert Gore. Thus, it was understandable when the national press came to Tennessee with the full expectation of seeing a massive youth movement for Gore. Their shocked disbelief (and, on occasion, utter consternation) when they found that the converse was true - is also understandable.

My opponent had minimal youth organization. It was not a campaign asset, and that which existed was poorly coordinated. On my side, the youth organization was abundantly apparent in every locality, large or small. Throughout the campaign we had over 8,500 sincere, attractive, articulate young people working day and night for my election.

The why of all this is important. The attached appendix explains the modus operandi, and sketches some of the activities, of these 8,500 workers. But if I had to state the real reason for the success of this operation, it was due to the fact that we not only had talented young people to lead it, but we gave them a freedom of action sufficient for them to



feel a personal sense of responsibility and a measurable sense of accomplishment.

In sum, I would like to work to take the best of our program and implement it (together with other ideas which might work in this area) on a national basis. The accompanying Appendices tell how.

Appendix III is a suggested time-flow chart for project development. You will notice the projected high budget (Appendix IV) is based upon the national campaign carrying the total cost of this project - a situation which I believe we can avoid. The projected Cost Feasibility Analysis (Appendix V), if valid, is evidence that this is not an unwarranted effort. Appendix VI is a brief demographic sketch of the new voter group whose ages fall between 18 and 22. Appendix VII is a short compendium of remarks on this issue by political analysts and others.

There are just two short footnotes I want to stress with regard to this proposal. First, it is presented as a national (50 state) program. Obviously this is important for the public image. However, from the practical side it can be reduced to a concentration of effort on the Nixon target states. Thus we could more effectively focus our talent and resources - within a lower budget.

In essence, my thesis is that, regardless of the scope of the program, this can be brought to fruition at a cost of less than 25¢ per additional Nixon vote. I know of no other area which would yield such a favorable cost-benefit ratio.

Secondly, I am very much aware of the real motivation behind, and implication of, the proposed limitation on media campaign expenditures. This vehicle will allow us to live within any such law Congress may pass without suffering. I should add that similar organizational expenditures which can be developed in other voter groups might prove equally advantageous, given this new limitation. I hope these avenues will be thoroughly utilized and would value the opportunity to work with you here as well.

## APPENDIX I

### Critique of Young Volunteers for Brock Tennessee Senatorial Campaign 1970

One of the most exciting and productive Youth Organizations in our nation's history was developed for Senator Bill Brock in the 1970 Tennessee Senatorial campaign. By working with the young people of Tennessee for the past 18 years Senator Brock has developed an extensive understanding of Tennessee's young generation. The Young Volunteers for Brock under the direction of John D. Stamps, Tom Bell and Larry Ledford capitalized on his past experiences and captured a tremendous majority of the youth support and vote.

Senator Brock was interested in involving any young individuals that were willing to contribute ability, financial resources, or moral support. Our primary objective in this youth movement was involvement. The Y.V.B. organization involved more people than any previous youth movement that the State of Tennessee had ever experienced. It emphasized Bill Brock's commitment to the youth of Tennessee through Y.V.B. organizations in every county, every city and on every college campus, as well as in most of the state high schools.

There were three primary segments of the state youth population we wished to develop during the course of the campaign -- young voters (employed or military), college students, and high school students.

These three movements were coordinated by a state chairman, deputy chairman (paid), and executive director (paid). There were also two field men (paid) traveling the state in direct contact with the county leaders. In addition there were also two volunteer office coordinators in our Nashville office at all times. The Young Volunteers for Brock were under the direct

supervision of Brock Campaign Manager, Ken Rietz, but for the most part were a separate organization from the regular campaign operations.

The Y.V.B. organization raised most of its own money, conducted its own projects, maintained its own offices, and developed its own staff. Though the Y.V.B. and regular campaign organization were separate operations, they worked together in every possible instance; and the Y.V.B. organization supplied much of the manpower for regular Brock campaign projects.

The Y.V.B. organization was divided into a number of segments all coordinated under the direction of the forementioned chairmen, executive director, and deputy chairman. These divisions were:

College	Finance	Y.R.'s
High School	Publicity	TAR's
Young Voters	Military	Seminar-training

Each of these divisions had its own director, and was carried out on a statewide basis.

Accomplishments of Young Volunteers for Brock, Tennessee Senatorial election 1970:

- The first and foremost accomplishment of the Y.V.B. organization was involvement. There were over 8,500 young people actively involved in every imaginable capacity of the Brock campaign.

- Y.V.B. organizations were developed in every county in the state. (Some of these counties had never even heard the term "Republican worker" before this election).

- All 38 major college campuses in the state were organized, and every resident hall on these campuses was canvassed.

- 17 mock elections were held across the state, of which we won 15, tied 1, and lost 1. (Development of win psychology)

- 368 high schools had active Y.V.B. clubs with memberships ranging from 18 to 189 young men and women.

- Over 1,000,000 flyers were distributed in the final 10 days of the campaign in a very profitable blitz effort.

- Over 26,000 bumper stickers were put on cars and over 860,000 pieces of Brock literature were distributed during three bus trips across the entire state (an additional 50,000 bumper stickers were placed in other drives).

- During a five day "kinfolk" operation, 28,000 Kinfolk cards were mailed throughout the state. (Kinfolk cards are postcards asking recipient, usually a relative, to vote for Bill Brock. They are hand signed.)

- Every major college and high school football game was canvassed with Brock literature - as was every other mass gathering of people - in the final weeks of the campaign.

- 125,000 pumpkin door hangers reading "Even the Great Pumpkin is Voting for Bill Brock", were placed on door knobs the night before Halloween.

- Youth "Demonstrations" were held for Bill Brock in every major metropolitan area.

- A mass "Young Voters" registration drive was carried out four months prior to election.

- Hospitals and old age homes were canvassed and the pro-Brock patients registered in August and September. In October and early November return visits allowed Brock supporters to vote absentee or by the assistance of transportation.

- Travel agencies were checked to see who was going out of town and these people were contacted and asked and assisted to vote absentee for Bill Brock before they left.

- A Young Volunteers for Brock newsletter with a circulation of 13,000 was published every other week.

- State, regional and district seminars training young people to work for Bill Brock were held throughout the state.

- Ecology projects were carried out in Bill Brock's name.

- Extensive election day activities - such as baby sitting, poll watching, car pools, etc.

These are just some of the many projects undertaken, and carried out by the Y.V.B. organization. We feel that the Y.V.B.'s activities were a major factor in the Senator's election. The Young Volunteers for Brock organization was an excellent example of what young people will do when they are asked to become actively involved. We attribute the fantastic success of the Y.V.B. organization to the following:

1. Bill Brock sincerely cared about the young people of Tennessee. He asked them openly to become involved, and he made them feel their voice would be heard. His organization met this commitment through constant organization and communication with the team.

2. The Y.V.B. organization was originated, developed, controlled, and staffed by a very talented group of young people who understood the youth of Tennessee and what their problems and interests were. Because the organization itself was young, it had no trouble communicating and involving the state's youth.

We have demonstrated that a group of responsible young people can participate in a constructive manner within the framework of a political campaign. The Brock campaign gave thousands of young Tennesseans the opportunity to become active in a meaningful manner in Tennessee Republican politics.

JOHN D. STAMPS

TOM D. BELL, JR.

## APPENDIX II

### PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL NIXON YOUTH CAMPAIGN

#### PHASE I. July, August, September and October

I propose the organization of those Members of Congress below the age of 40 into an ad hoc advisory board under the Nixon campaign manager to offer broad policy guidance for the National campaign among those voters between the ages of 18 and 22. This Board would in turn appoint a limited staff of no more than 5 people initially to develop the basic outline of a national campaign and to develop preliminary state contact lists of Republican leaders, and through them, potential state youth leaders.

This first stage would require a maximum of 4 months for implementation, running from 1 July through 1 November, and a maximum budget of approximately \$42,000.

#### PHASE II. - November, December, and January

Following the preliminary planning stage, phase II would run from November through January of 1972, and would primarily be concerned with completion of the basic campaign plan and the employment and training of the remainder of the national and regional field staff required.

#### PHASE III. - February, March, and April

Phase III contains those months of February, March and April 1972, during which time the campaign would begin to move into its public role. By the end of April, full state and regional staffing should be completed. At this point we can begin the young voter education and identification drives. The school phase of this program would concentrate on identifying positive and possible Nixon supporters among high schools, vocational schools, junior college and colleges, concentrating first, of course, on the 21 target states.



Simultaneously the campaign among youth employed in the civilian work force and the military would proceed apace, with a drive to identify not only all potential Nixon supporters in this particular group, but to specifically enlist the young community leadership necessary to organize these groups and effectuate their voting strength.

Also during this period we would be in position, having completed the identification program on a community basis, to conduct a registration drive to maximize the registration of those voters who would tend to favor our campaign. To be perfectly clear, I do not advocate a mass non-specific registration drive - it's hard enough to hunt where the ducks are. We have neither the time nor the resources to do otherwise.

#### PHASE IV.

Phase IV would be concerned with a completion of our organizational structure at both the state, county, and community level in order to be prepared to go into the fall campaign. During these summer months of May, June and July the primary emphasis would be upon organizational structure and upon the completion of our voter identification and registration programs among the employed youth.

#### PHASE V.

Phase V is of course the climax effort to direct the total resources identified and organized up to this point toward the maximum vote turnout for Richard Nixon. By early October the education, identification and registration of all voting age youth should be completed as well as organization of these pro Nixon young people into campaign teams. During this time the

direct mail program to both employed and college young people will reach its maximum, as will the organizational effort to direct the energies of this group towards constructive campaign activity which is coordinated with and complimentary to the National Republican campaign and the campaign as it is conducted on a state and local basis.

The sum total of this effort is directed towards achieving a goal of 450,000 attractive, articulate, young workers for Nixon to be made available as a basic campaign team for the national campaign.

Suggested Program Objectives and Projects

Purpose - Develop a national leadership team with the capacity to:

- 1) train and lead regional state leaders
- 2) create a program which will excite and involve a significant portion of the 18,000,000 voters between 18 and 22
- 3) support and supplement the program of the national campaign

Goals - Involvement through organization and challenge of:

- 1) youth for Nixon teams in every state
- 2) youth for Nixon organizations among the working and military young
- 3) youth for Nixon organizations in every high school
- 4) youth for Nixon organizations in every college
- 4) 450,000 young workers for Nixon in support of the regular campaign.

Potential Projects:

- 1) national youth education drives
- 2) national youth canvass
- 3) national youth registration of pro-Nixon youth

- 4) national youth voter turnout of pro-Nixon youth
- 5) national hospital and nursing home registration of pro-Nixon aged (care program)
- 6) national absentee voter drive
- 7) national bumper sticker, bill board, flyer campaign, etc.
- 8) national support program for the Nixon campaign in such areas as poll watchers, precinct workers, baby sitting, drivers, etc.
- 9) national "kinfolk" operation

Suggested Job Description Summaries - by Groups

Employed Staff Planning Group This group will begin work on the preliminary campaign design, begin contact with national, regional and state Republican and campaign leaders, develop lists of potential contacts by states, catalog information on all high schools, vocational schools, colleges, etc., form and staff the national advisory board, contact, employ and train regional staff.

National Advisory Board This group will oversee entire campaign, approve budgets, approve major staff appointments, approve major campaign themes, and act in a continuing advisory role to assist the national program staff.

National Staff This group will conduct the national campaign, oversee and direct regional field activities, conduct fund raising when and where authorized by the National Nixon campaign, coordinate all activities with the National Nixon campaign manager, publish newsletter, design national youth campaign themes, etc.

Regional Staff This group will supervise and coordinate the activities of state organizations within each region, implement programs as requested by the national staff, train and supervise state leaders.

State Staff This group will have direct responsibility of implementation of the state youth program, coordination and cooperation with the state Nixon campaign, fund raising as authorized by the Nixon state campaign manager, organization of every high school, vocational school, and college in the state young voter canvass, young voter registration drives, young voter vote drive, and such other programs as they are asked to implement. It should be the stated objective of the state youth campaign to identify, enlist, and organize a minimum of one young worker for each 40 young voters (18-22) in that state. Each worker would have a target of identifying, encouraging, and voting 20 voters for President Nixon.

APPENDIX III

	PRE-PLANNING STAGE	FULL PLANNING & STAFFING STAGE	EARLY STATE ORGANIZATIONAL STAGE	FULL ORGANIZATIONAL STAGE	FULL CAMPAIGN
	Jul - Oct 1971	Nov Dec Jan 1971	Feb Mar Apr	May Jun Jul	Aug Sept Oct
staff planning group	50% 100%				
name advisory committee	33% 66% 100%				
develop preliminary state contact lists	50% 100%				
develop basic campaign plan	25% 50%	100%			
employ national & regional field staff	25% 50%	75% 100%			
employ or appoint state organization		25%	50% 75% 100%		
conduct voter identification drives			10% 20% 30%	40% 50% 60%	80% 100%
conduct registration drives			10% 20% 30%	40% 50% 60%	80% 100%
implement full campaign					100%

APPENDIX IV  
PROJECTED HIGH BUDGET

		<u>National Program</u>	<u>State Program</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
Phase I	July 1971	\$6,000		
	August	8,000		
	September	10,000		
	October	<u>12,000</u>		
	Phase I total	\$36,000		\$36,000
Phase II	November	23,000		
	December	28,000		
	January '72	<u>30,000</u>		
	Phase II total	81,000	<u>\$12,000</u> 12,000	93,000
Phase III	February	32,000	15,000	
	March	34,000	18,000	
	April	<u>36,000</u>	<u>21,000</u>	
	Phase III total	102,000	54,000	156,000
Phase IV	May	38,000	24,000	
	June	40,000	27,000	
	July	<u>42,000</u>	<u>30,000</u>	
	Phase IV total	120,000	81,000	201,000
Phase V	August	45,000	30,000	
	September	50,000	30,000	
	October	<u>55,000</u>	<u>30,000</u>	
	Phase V total	<u>150,000</u>	<u>90,000</u>	<u>240,000</u>
Total Project Cost		489,000	237,000	<u>\$726,000</u>

APPENDIX V

COST FEASIBILITY ANALYSTS - LOW BASIS

I	Estimated Vote without Youth Program		
	Potential Voters (18-22)	18,000,000	
	x Estimated turnout 25%	4,500,000	
	x Projected Nixon Vote (minimum 22%)	990,000	
	(maximum 44%)	1,980,000	
	Estimated 1972 Nixon Vote (mean 33%)		1,500,000
II	Estimated Vote with Youth Program		
	Proposed Goal of Workers	450,000	
	x 20 Votes per worker	9,000,000	
	x 50% efficiency factor	4,500,000	
	Estimated 1972 Nixon Vote produced by Youth Organization (from all ages)		4,500,000
III	Net Additional Nixon Votes		<u>3,000,000</u>
IV	Cost Per Vote		
	Estimated Minimum Program Cost	<u>489,000</u>	
	÷ New Voters	3,000,000	
	Minimum Cost per vote		<u>16.3¢</u>
	Estimated Maximum Program Cost	<u>720,000</u>	
	÷ New Voters	3,000,000	
	Maximum Cost per Vote		<u>24.0¢</u>

APPENDIX VI

PROJECTED PROFILE 18 - 22 year olds in 1972

Newly eligible (18-20)	11.4 million	8.4% voting age population
Newly eligible (21-22)	<u>7.1 million</u>	<u>5.1%</u> voting age population
	18.5	13.5%
Total in college	6.5 million (1)	
Total employed - civilian	8.0 million	
Total employed-military	1.0 million	
Unemployed	.8 million	
Housewives	1.7 million	
Other	<u>.5 million</u>	
	18.5	

College Student Profile (2)

Republican	24%	Conservative	17%
Independent	44%	Moderate	40%
Democrat	32%	Liberal	37%

(1) This figure represents only the college population in this age group.

The total census of higher education is slightly over 8 million. If added to this voter group, it would carry the total to 20+million, or 14+% of the population.

(2) These represent a composite of generally accepted national polls - our own, Gallup, Harris, etc.



## APPENDIX VII

### Statistical Information

Christian Science Monitor, December 22, 1970

The Supreme Court may have elected a President.

When the votes are counted in 1972, it may well be that the 18 to 21 age group will have been decisive in nudging the election one way or another. A Harris poll of December 3, shows Senator Edmund S. Muskie picking up 49% of this new youth vote, with only 22% going to President Nixon. Interestingly enough, George C. Wallace picks up 19% of this same youth vote in the poll which ran a hypothetical three man, Nixon-Muskie-Wallace race. This poll might well spur GOP planners to include in their strategy more programs with obvious appeal to youth. There is at least one other national poll that shows Mr. Muskie running well behind Senator Edward M. Kennedy among the young people. Should there be a Democratic surge in the direction of Kennedy, this factor, a Kennedy appeal to youth, might pull the Senator into the nomination.

The President and the GOP should be giving much thought to the youth groups as it shapes its legislative program. One might look for more GOP emphasis on programs that aid the environment and further Civil Rights, for example. Certainly, too, this new development will do nothing to slow the Nixon-engendered momentum for getting out of the Vietnam war.

U. S. News and World Report, January 4, 1971

At least 21 million more persons will be eligible to vote in the 1972 presidential and congressional elections as a result of an act of Congress and a December 21 Supreme Court ruling.

<u>Total Voting - Age Population</u>	<u>138.9 million</u>
Newly Eligible Young Voters	18.5 million
Voting-age population under 21	11.4 million
New Voters, ages 21 and 22	7.1 million

Thus, in 1972, about 1 in 8 Americans of voting age in federal elections will be old enough to vote for the first time.

The Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1971

"...The conventional reasoning could err on 2 counts: More of the 18-to-21 year-olds may vote than expected, and they may vote more monolithically, usually on the liberal side. In 1972, at least, widespread publicity about the first-time voters should swell their participation. Youth groups and civic organizations plan special drives to spur registration and voting, by young people. The war, the draft, student loan policy or other special impact issues could enlarge the youth turnout."

The Washington Post, June 29, 1970

A recent professional poll suggests the Democratic party identification is waning among the young. Taken early this year, the poll found that 40% of the population identifies with the Democratic party (while 27% chooses the GOP). But only 30% of the 21 - to -29 age group identified with the Democrats -- a slippage of 10 points from the nation as a whole.

Broader attitudinal surveys indicate that the young despite their growing indifference to centrist major parties, are not moving consistently toward either extreme.

A Gallup poll early this year found that adults under 30 years of age were divided about equally between liberal and conservative designations.

Is the young generation really violently opposed to the war in Vietnam? Apparently not, if the pollsters are right. A series of Gallup polls indicated that young voters were less inclined than their elders to call the war a mistake.

What of the attitude toward Richard Nixon? Is he really far out of tune with the younger generation? Again, the pollsters say no. As late as last November, 62% of the people aged 21 to 29 approved his handling of the presidency, about the same proportion as the over-50's, according to Gallup.

A poll by a national professional sampling organization concludes, bewilderingly, that 70% of the youngest voting segment in America consider themselves to be members of the "silent majority".

The Gallup Opinion Index, June, 1969

A growing tendency exists on campus to avoid identification with either major party. The proportion of college students who describe themselves as Independent in politics has grown steadily since 1966 when 39% put themselves into the category to 52% today, the high point to date. Among the remaining 48% who indicate a party preference, the weight of opinion

The Gallup Opinion Index, June, 1969 cont'd

slightly favors the Democrats.

Party labels have far less appeal on campuses today than they do with the general public of today. If the political views of the present generation of college students are indicative of a trend that will gain momentum during the next decade, then the two major parties need to do a lot of new thinking and planning.

The Gallup Opinion Index, March, 1970

If the 10.5 million Americans who are 18, 19, and 20 years old obtain the right to vote in all 50 states they could easily change the result of close elections such as the 1968 Presidential election, when Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey were separated by only 514,155 votes, (1% of the total vote) and the 1960 election when John Kennedy and Richard Nixon were separated by the bare margin of 118,550 votes (0.2 of 1 per cent of the total vote).

About one in three civilians 18, 19, and 20 years old are currently enrolled in colleges and universities. Two persons in three (7 million or 66%) have completed four years of high school; about 2.9 million (28%) have completed one to three years of high school while 600,000 have had less education.

Date in January, 1970 Bureau of Labor Statistics report indicated that about 5.9 million 18, 19 and 20 year olds were in the civilian labor force. Of this number, about 5.2 million were employed and 600,000 unemployed.

The Gallup Opinion Index, March 1970 cont'd

Another 800,000 were in the armed forces. Two million five hundred thousand were going to school, 1.1 million were young women keeping house; and 300,000 were otherwise classified. Males and females in this age group are approximately equal in number: 5.3 million men and 5.2 million women.

The Gallup Opinion Index -- 1971 Poll of College Students

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>
Lindsay	81%	19%
McCarthy	79%	21%
Muskie	78%	22%
Kennedy	75%	25%
McGovern	76%	24%
Nixon	49%	51%

Party labels have become increasingly meaningless as a means of classifying college students politically. The most recent survey shows approximately half of college students interviewed (52%) identifying themselves as Independents, compared to only 30% who say they are Democrats and 18% classifying themselves as Republicans.

Survey evidence indicates that a more meaningful method of classifying college students is their political philosophy. 35% consider themselves Left to Far Left, while 63% consider themselves Moderate to Right Wing. The proportion of students describing themselves as Left to Far Left increases by class from 28% among freshmen to a majority of 59% among graduate students. A great majority of students reject the extremes of any political spectrum.

Senator Bill Brock, March, 1971

"The forgotten voter is not on campus, he is a 20 year old breadwinner hard at work providing for his young wife and new baby. He is one of the silent 70% who do not go to college. His philosophy is at once pragmatic and patriotic. Undisturbed by welfare rhetoric or esoteric promises, his loyalty is to his family. His vote will be determined not by party, but by the hope for economic stability, job security, and opportunity -- and a lasting peace. His is the voice of common sense. Those who heed it will earn its support.

The New York Times, June 28, 1970

John S. Andrews, Chairman of the Ohio GOP, cites a survey indicating that about 60% of young voters from Ohio remain independent, with the remaining 40% splitting evenly between the two parties. "It has always been assumed that party patterns won't change because the young follow the voting patterns of their parents, but in this time of upheaval, I am no longer sure of that."

Democrat Governor Warren E. Hearnes, Missouri, said, "If Nixon signs that bill, he's beat. The 18 year olds are against him."

Marvin Madson, St. Louis, National Chairman of the New Democratic Coalition declared, "I think it will make politicians fear a swing to the left and cause them to move to the left even though they don't have to. It will be an unnecessary reaction, but all to the good as far as I am concerned."

The New York Times, June 28, 1970 cont'd

Alabama Governor Albert P. Brewer, defeated for nomination last month by Wallace, said he would have won had the 18 year olds been able to vote for him. "...they were progressive and less receptive to Mr. Wallace's racial appeals."

E. J. Boling, University of Tennessee President, said, "a lot of people may be surprised at the votes these young people cast, because I am not sure the 18 to 20 year olds who are being heard reflect the views of the majority in that age bracket."

The Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1971

Nixon seems to be one pro, in fact, who recognizes the possibility that lowered voting age, particularly when counted with new, more liberal residency requirements, may have far more impact than most professional politicians and election-watchers currently predict. "...on his televised conversation Monday night, he conceded that younger voters appear to favor the Democrats, though he quickly added his belief that large number of young people are undecided, and that coming achievements would give the GOP a very good crack at this age group by 1972..."

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Vote by Groups in Presidential Elections  
(1952 — 1968)

	1952		1956		1960		1964		1968		Wal- lace %
	Dem. Rep.		D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
NATIONAL .....	44.6	55.4	42.2	57.8	50.1	49.9	61.3	38.7	43.0	43.4	13.6
Men .....	47	53	45	55	52	48	60	40	41	43	16
Women .....	42	58	39	61	49	51	62	38	45	43	12
White .....	43	57	41	59	49	51	59	41	38	47	15
Non-white .....	79	21	61	39	68	32	94	6	85	12	3
College .....	34	66	31	69	39	61	52	48	37	54	9
High School .....	45	55	42	58	52	48	62	38	42	43	15
Grade School .....	52	48	50	50	55	45	66	34	52	33	15
Prof. & Bus. ....	36	64	32	68	42	58	54	46	34	56	10
White Collar .....	40	60	37	63	48	52	57	43	41	47	12
Manual .....	55	45	50	50	60	40	71	29	50	35	15
Farmers .....	33	67	46	54	48	52	53	47	29	51	20
Under 30 .....	51	49	43	57	54	46	64	36	47	38	15
30-49 years .....	47	53	45	55	54	46	63	37	44	41	15
50 years & older ...	39	61	39	61	46	54	59	41	41	47	12
Protestant .....	37	63	37	63	38	62	55	45	35	49	16
Catholic .....	56	44	51	49	78	22	76	24	59	33	8
Republicans .....	8	92	4	96	5	95	20	80	9	86	5
Democrats .....	77	23	85	15	84	16	87	13	74	12	17
Independents .....	15	85	11	89	15	85	13	87	17	13	78



STATISTICAL INFORMATION

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Question: "This card lists political positions from the far left to the far right. Considering your own political views, where would you place yourself on this scale?"

DECEMBER, 1970

	Far Left	Left	Middle-of-Road	Right	Far Right	Don't Know
	%	%	%	%	%	%
NATIONAL	7	30	40	15	2	6
SEX						
Male	7	30	37	18	2	6
Female	5	29	47	11	2	6
AGE						
18 years & under	7	30	40	15	2	6
19 years	4	32	42	14	2	6
20 years	4	34	37	18	3	4
21 - 23 years	11	30	41	12	1	5
24 years & over	6	38	31	17	-	8
REGION OF COLLEGE						
East	8	39	39	5	2	7
Midwest	8	29	38	17	3	5
South	5	21	53	17	1	3
West	6	29	32	21	2	10
TYPE OF COLLEGE						
Public	7	27	42	15	2	7
Private	7	37	36	14	2	4
Denominational	4	31	41	17	4	3
PARENTS' INCOME						
\$15,000 & over	7	34	36	17	2	4
\$10,000 - \$14,999	4	29	44	14	3	6
\$ 7,000 - \$ 9,999	6	30	44	15	1	4
Under \$7,000	8	27	37	19	2	7
CLASS IN SCHOOL						
Freshman	6	22	48	15	2	7
Sophomore	5	34	36	17	2	6
Junior	6	29	41	15	3	6
Senior	7	36	36	16	1	4
Graduate	15	44	32	6	-	3
RELIGION						
Protestant	3	22	48	20	2	5
Catholic	3	27	45	18	2	5

*Will be  
Seniors  
in '72*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD  
E.O. 13526, 6-18-82  
By: [signature] 4-2-82

July 12, 1971

Mr. Thomas W. Benham  
Executive Vice President  
Opinion Research Corporation  
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Dear Tom:

First, let me apologize for the delay in my response after your joint discussion with Herb Klein about the plan to spread your polls for Opinion Research Corporation around somewhat more among the press. There are a number of good reasons, but I won't go into them.

The attached are key newspaper bureaus -- groups and individual newspapers -- that have headquarters in Washington whom your man would want to contact with the polls. I have selected a key newspaper for each city based on either circulation or general attitude that I believe is most likely to cooperate with you in this project.

Every state is covered in either the group or individual list.

My suggestions are these:

1. First, have your man make contact with the group newspaper bureaus and indicate the poll material will be available to them on a continuing basis if they care to use it. He should have samples of recent polls and some method, if possible, of proving their accuracy. The key groups in this regard are Copley, Gannett, Hearst, Knight, Newhouse, Scripps Howard and (because of the New Hampshire Primary) Loeb. But all the groups should be surveyed for usage. This is Tab A.
2. Then, when you get a test of sentiment among the groups, you should go after the individual newspapers. I would be careful to avoid circulation duplication. For example, if Bill Theis at Hearst gets approval to run the survey, I would not contact other papers in Albany, Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, San Francisco or Seattle (although San Francisco is no problem since the Chronicle uses only the wires including the special wires and has no Washington man. These are Tab B.

3. Simultaneously, I would contact the key television news stations listed in Tab C. A personal visit is, of course, preferable, but failing that a good, well-considered and clearly-written letter should do the job.

If we put together this package, it will really be our own little mini-syndicate. Correctly done, we really could score. Then, I would suggest we mail it out to a broadbrush list -- editorial editors, and radio-television news directors so they will receive it about one day late -- in time not to ruin the exclusivity but in time to use it if they want or keep it for reference if they want.

In addition, I am including at Tab D a list of columnists in the Washington area whom I feel should get the survey. Most of them won't use it, but all of them will keep it in their files -- and eventually they'll work it into some of their columns, which shouldn't hurt.

I hope this is helpful. Please don't hesitate to call on me if I can be of further assistance.

With my best wishes,

Cordially,

DeVan L. Shumway  
Assistant to the Director of  
Communications for the  
Executive Branch

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Klein  
Mr. Colson  
Mr. Strachan

WIRE SERVICES

Associated Press  
1300 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 20036  
833-5300

Ray Stephens, Assistant Bureau Manager  
Walter R. Mears, National Political Writer

United Press International  
315 National Press Building 20004  
EX 3-3430

Grant Dillman, News Editor  
Raymond Lehr, National Political Writer

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NEWSPAPER GROUPS AND BUREAUS (Washington Correspondents - Managers)

Booth Newspapers of Michigan  
515 National Press Building 20004  
737-7770

William F. Pyper, Bureau Chief  
Robert A. Hoving, Correspondent

(Ann Arbor News, Bay City Times, Flint Journal, Grand Rapids Press, Jackson Citizen Patriot, Kalamazoo Gazette, Muskegon Chronicle, Saginaw News)

Copley News Service  
1629 K Street, N.W. 20004  
396-8565

Raymond J. McHugh, Bureau Chief

(Alhambra Post-Advocate, Aurora Beacon-News, Burbank Review, Culver City Star-News, Elgin Courier News, Glendale News-Press, Joliet Herald News, Monrovia News-Post, Redondo Beach Daily Breeze, Sacramento Union, San Diego Tribune, San Diego Union, San Pedro News Pilot, Springfield State Journal, Springfield State Register, Venice Vanguard.)

Carpenter News Bureau  
784 National Press Building 20004  
393-4488

Leslie E. Carpenter, Bureau Chief

(Abilene Reporter News, Amarillo News & Globe Times, Arkansas Gazette,

Carpenter News Bureau (Continued)

Austin American, Austin Statesman, Beaumont Enterprise, Beaumont Journal, Corpus Christi Caller-Times, Honolulu Advertiser, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, San Angelo Standard Times, San Antonio Express and Evening News, Waco News Tribune, Times-Herald, Wichita Falls Record-News & Times.)

Donrey Washington News Bureau

780 National Press Building 20004  
783-1760

Bill Kennedy, Bureau Chief

(Aberdeen Daily World, Bartlesville Examiner-Enterprise, Blackwell (Okla.) Journal-Tribune, Booneville (Ark.) Democrat, Carson City (Nevada) Appeal, Chicasha (Okla.) Daily Express, Ely (Nevada) Daily Times, Frederick (Okla.) Daily Leader, Guymon (Okla.) Daily Herald, Futhrie (Okla.) Daily Leader, Hawaii Today, Hilo Tribune-Herald, Holdenville (Oklahoma) Daily News, Kealahou (Hawaii) West, Las Vegas (Nevada) Review-Journal, Moberly (Mo.) Monitor-Index & Democrat, Okmulgee (Okla.) Daily Times, Ontario (Calif.) Daily Report, Pauls Valley (Okla.) Daily Democrat, Pawhuska (Okla.) Journal-Capital, Pomona (Calif.) Progress Bulletin, Red Bluff (Calif.) Daily News, Rogers (Ark.) Daily News, Southwest Times Record (Ark.), Weatherford (Texas) Democrat, Wewoka (Okla.) Daily Times.)

Federated Publications, Inc.

1107 National Press Building 20004  
737-2901

Thomas T. Ochiltree, Bureau Chief

(Battle Creek (Mich.) Enquirer & News, Bellingham (Wash.) Herald, Boise (Idaho) Statesman, Lafayette (Ind.) Journal and Courier, Lansing (Mich.) State Journal, Marion (Ind.) Chronicle Tribune, Olympia (Wash.) Daily Olympian.)

Gannett News Service

795 National Press Building 20004  
393-3460

Jack W. Germond, Bureau Chief

(Binghamton (NY) Press, Camden (NJ) Courier-Post, Cocoa (Fla.) Today, Danville (Ill.) Commercial-News, Elmira (NY) Star-Gazette, Hartford (Conn.) Times, Ithaca (NY) Journal, Mamaroneck (NY) Daily Times, Melbourne (Fla.) Times, Mt. Vernon (NY) Daily Argus, New Rochelle (NY) Standard-Star, Newburg-Beacon (NY) News, Niagara Falls (NY) Gazette, Olean (NY) Times-Herald, Ossining (NY) Citizen Register, Peekskill (NY) Evening Star, Pensacola (Fla.) Evening News, Pensacola (Fla.) Journal, Plainfield (NJ) Courier News, Port Chester

Gannett News Service (Continued)

(NY) Daily Item, Port Huron (Mich.) Times Herald, Rochester (NY) Democrat & Chronicle, Rochester (NY) Times-Union, Rockford (Ill.) Morning Star & Register Republic, Rockland County (NY) Journal-News, San Bernardino (Calif.) Sun & Evening Telegram, Saratoga Springs (NY) Saratogian, Tarrytown (NY) Daily News, Titusville (Fla.) Star-Advocate, Utica (Mich.) Sentinel, Utica (NY) Daily Press, Utica (NY) Observer-Dispatch, White Plains (NY) Reporter Dispatch, Yonkers (NY) Herald Statesman. )

Griffin-Larrabee News Bureau

1237 National Press Building 20004  
554-3579

Donald R. Larrabee, Bureau Chief

(Anchorage (Alaska) Times, Augusta (Maine) Kennebec Journal, Bangor (Maine) Daily News, Brockton (Mass.) Enterprise, Buffalo (NY) Courier Express, Cape Cod (Mass.) Standard-Times, Charleston (W. Va.) Daily Mail, Danbury (Conn.) News-Times, Fairbanks (Alaska) Daily News-Miner, Fall River (Mass.) Herald News, Greenville (S.C.) News, Holyoke (Mass.) Transcript-Telegram, Lynn (Mass.) Item, Middletown (NY) Times Herald Record, New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times, Newport (R.I.) Daily News, Northampton (Mass.) Gazette, Oneonta (NY) Star, Pawtucket (R.I.) Times, Plattsburgh (NY) Press-Republican, Pocono (Pa.) Record, Port Jervis (NY) Union-Gazette, Portland (Maine) Press Herald & Evening Express, Quincy (Mass.) Patriot Ledger, Sioux City (Iowa) Journal, Trenton (NJ) Times, Waterloo (Iowa) Courier, Waterville (Maine) Sentinel, Worcester (Mass.) Telegram-Gazette.

Hearst Newspapers & Hearst Headline Service  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 20006  
298-6920

J. William Theis, Bureau Chief

(Albany (NY) Knickerbocker News & Times-Union, Baltimore (Md.) News-American, Boston (Mass.) Advertiser & Record American, Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald-Examiner, San Antonio (Texas) Light, San Francisco (Calif.) Examiner, Schenectady (NY) Union-Star, Seattle (Wash.) Post-Intelligencer.)

Frank Hewlett Bureau

720 National Press Building 20004  
783-4496

Frank Hewlett, Manager

(Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Pacific Daily News (Guam), Salt Lake City Tribune)

Knight Newspapers

1195 National Press Building 20004  
638-2844

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(Akron (Ohio) Beacon Journal, Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, Detroit Free Press, Miami Herald, Philadelphia Inquirer, Tallahassee Democrat.)

Loeb Newspapers

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965-5610

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Newhouse National News Service

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Ridder Publications

1325 E Street, N.W. 20004  
737-8627

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(Aberdeen (S.D.) American-News, Boulder (Colo.) Daily-Camera, Duluth (Minn.) Herald and News Tribune, Garden Grove (Calif.) News, Gary (Ind.) Post-Tribune, Grand Forks (N.D.) Herald, Long Beach (Calif.) Independent & Press Telegram, Pasadena Star News, San Jose Mercury and News, St. Paul Pioneer Press & Dispatch.

Scripps Howard Newspaper Alliance  
 1013 Thirteenth Street, N.W. 20005  
 DI 7-7750

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 328 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. 20003  
 544-5100

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 1253 National Press Building 20004  
 393-0146

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(Baton Rouge Morning Advocate & State Times, Chattanooga News Free-Press, Dayton Journal Herald, Fort Worth Star Telegram, Houston Chronicle, Jackson Clarion Ledger, Nashville Tennessean, Orleans States Item, Raleigh News & Observer, Shreveport Times, Wichita Beacon & Eagle, Wilmington Evening Journal & Morning News, Youngstown Vindicator.)

Frank Vander Linden  
 128 C Street, N.E. 20003  
 544-5200

Frank Vander Linden, Bureau Chief

(Jackson (Miss.) Daily News, Nashville Banner)



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Cleveland Plain Dealer  
521 National Press Building 20004  
638-1366

John Peter Leacacos, Bureau Chief

Columbus Dispatch  
809 National Press Building 20004  
DI 7-3144

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Dallas Morning News  
637 National Press Building 20004  
NA 8-5030

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Dayton Daily News  
557 National Press Building 20004  
393-2550

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Denver Post  
993 National Press Building 20004  
RE 7-1381

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Des Moines Register & Tribune  
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347-9111

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NA 8-4566

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 788 National Press Building 20004  
 638-4332

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 638-6425

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(Indianapolis News, Muncie Press, Phoenix Gazette)

Kansas City Star and Times  
 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 20006  
 298-7770

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Louisville Courier-Journal & Times  
 1265 National Press Building 20004  
 628-7704

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Los Angeles Times  
 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 20006  
 296-1440

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 Thomas J. Foley, Political Writer

Milwaukee Journal  
 734 National Press Building 20004  
 RE 7-6453

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Minneapolis Tribune  
 940 National Press Building 20004  
 DI 7-5885

Charles F. Bailey, Bureau Chief and White House Correspondent

New Orleans Times Picayune  
1029 National Press Building 20004  
737-2934

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Newark News  
507 National Press Building 20004  
NA 8-4240

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New York Daily News  
1272 National Press Building 20004  
NA 8-5058

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Newsday  
621 National Press Building 20004  
393-6686

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Oklahoma City Times & Daily Oklahoman  
907 National Press Building 20004  
628-0335

Allan W. Cromley, Bureau Chief

Omaha World-Herald  
1217 National Press Building 20004  
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Philadelphia Bulletin  
1296 National Press Building 20004  
737-0403

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Robert Roth, Correspondent

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1280 National Press Building 20004  
EX 3-4580

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925 National Press Building 20004  
NA 8-6214

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20005 Stirrup Lane  
Alexandria, Virginia  
780-1325

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1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 20006  
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5716 N. Kings Highway  
Alexandria, Virginia 22303  
SO 5-5478

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718 National Press Building 20004  
347-4350

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Toledo Blade  
1280 National Press Building 20004  
EX 3-4580

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330 A Street, S.E. 20003  
544-2998

Malvina Stephenson Correspondent


Washington Star  
225 Virginia Avenue, S.E. 20003  
LI 3-5000

Newbold Noyes, Editor

Winston Salem Journal & Twin City Sentinel  
1814 37th Street, N.W. 20007  
333-7820

Lloyd T. Preslar, Correspondent

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Atlanta - Dave Riggs, WSB-TV  
Birmingham - Joe Langston, WBRC-TV  
Boston - Jeff Schiffman, WBZ  
Chicago - Ward Quall, WGN  
Cleveland - Bill Feest, WJW  
Columbus - Tom Dorsey, WBNS  
Dallas - Eddie Barker, KDFW  
Denver - Jack Bennet, KLZ  
Des Moines - Bob Wilbanks, WHO  
Houston - Eddie Barker, KDFW (see Dallas)  
Indianapolis - R. Lee Giles, WISH-TV  
Los Angeles -- Bill Eames, KNXT  
Joe Benti, KABC  
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Bill Bayer, WPLG  
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Washington, D.C. - Andrew Ockershausen, WMAL-TV

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Charles Bartlett (News Focus)	Publishers-Hall
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Marquis Childs (Washington Calling)	United Features
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Clayton Fritchey	Newsday Specials
John A. Goldsmith (Inside Washington)	Publishers-Hall
Noel Grove (Washington Notebook)	Newspaper Enterprise



John Herling (Report on Labor)	National Newspaper Syndicate
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Marianne Means	King Features
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Carl T. Rowan	Publishers Hall
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Richard Starnes	United Features
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Nick Thimmesch (Eye on the Presidency)	Newday Specials
Walter Trohan (Report from Washington)	Chicago Tribune
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Philip Wagner

Wagner

W. David Webb  
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Webb

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United Features

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Register & Tribune